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Respondent/Appellee (hereinafter "Robin," or "Mrs. Doyle") submits the following
as her Response Brief in the above-referenced appeal:
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court granted Certiorari to Mr. Doyle on January 20,2010. The
Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review rulings of the Utah Court Appeals under
U.C.A. §78A-3-102(3)(a) and the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 45-51.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On Certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the Court of Appeals" decision to determine
whether that Court correctly reviewed the decision of the Trial Court. Utah State Tax
Commission v. Stevenson, 150 P.3d 521 (Utah 2006). The Court of Appeals' decision is
reviewed for correctness which means the Supreme Court decides the matter for itself and
conclusions of law of the lower court are afforded no deference. Bear River Mutual
Insurance Co. v Wall, 978 P.23 460 (Utah 1999). The issue of whether or not the statutory
requirements for the findings of modification are met under the facts presented to the trial
court is a mixed question of law and fact. Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658,
661 (Utah 1997). This Court should review the affirmation of the factual findings under the
"clearly erroneous" standard and review application of the statute to those findings under the
"abuse of discretion" standard. Platts, 947 P.2d at 661.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue No. 1: Whether the Court of Appeals was correct to affirm the District Court' s
refusal to formally bifurcate the receipt of evidence at the trial relating to change of
circumstances and best interests of the child.
Issue No. 2: Whether the Court of Appeals was correct to affirm the District Court's
determination and findings that there was a substantial material change sufficient to consider
a change in custody.
Issue No. 3: Whether the Court of Appeals was corrdct to affirm the District Court's
modification of child support based on Rule 54(c) of the L^ah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, AND RULipS
The following Code and Rule provisions are referericed, as follows:
(1)

Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(1), equitable Orders may be included in
divorce decrees.

(2)

Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-10.4, standards ffor modification of custody order.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

These parties were divorced by decree entered February 28, 2005, after a bench trial
before Judge Frank Noel. The parties have one (1) child (together, namely Hyrum Doyle
(DOB 07/29/1996), who was age 8 at the time of the divofce trial. He is a child of special
needs, with mental and physical handicaps. His mother Robin Doyle is legally blind and
receives Social Security Disability payments for his benefit.
-2-

When the trial was held, Douglas Doyle had temporary custody of the child and
resided in Salt Lake, and Robin Doyle was residing in Denver, Colorado. The Decree of
Divorce awarded Mr. Doyle sole legal and physical custody of the child and also ordered
Mrs. Doyle the following opportunity, "in the event (Robin) relocates to the Salt Lake Valley,
the parties will have joint legal and physical custody and shall share time equally in
alternating weeks and on holidays, as per standard schedule" (Decree of Divorce, ^2)
Shortly after trial, Mrs. Doyle filed a Rule 60 Motion for Relief From Judgment and
Mr. Doyle filed a Rule 59 Motion for A New Trial. These were heard by Judge Deno
Himonas, who denied the Motion for A New Trial and granted the Motion for Relief From
Judgment, based on a finding that the "automatic" change of custody stated in the Decree of
Divorce was not legally permissible and that a change of custody required a notice and
hearing. Mrs. Doyle moved from Denver to Salt Lake City May 9, 2005, and she filed a
Petition to Modify seeking custody in October 2005.
A custody trial was held October 2 and 3, 2007, before Judge Denise Lindberg and
included a custody evaluation and testimony by Valerie Hale, Ph.D.

The evaluator

recommended that the mother, Robin Doyle, have sole legal and physical custody of the
minor child.

The trial court found that there were substantial, material changes in

circumstances that required review of the custody decision. The changes included the
unanticipated change in the custody order due to the granting of the Motion to Set Aside
Judgment by Judge Himonas. The evidence also supported review based on the lack of
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stability and serious problems in Mr. Doyle's parenting of the child, which lead to
deterioration of Hyrum's psychological, social, and educational functioning.
The Utah Court of Appeals issued an opinion on review filed October 29,2009. That
opinion held that the trial court did not err in failing to hoiftseparate hearings on the issue
of changed circumstances and best interest and that there ™as no abuse of discretion in the
trial court's determination that substantial material changed had occurred since entry of the
Decree of Divorce. The reviewing Court thus affirmed the trial court's decision that custody
would change from the father to the mother, Appellee Robm Doyle. The Court of Appeals
also upheld the authority of the trial court to modify child support although finding that the
trial court applied the wrong guidelines and thus ordered ai reversal and remand to the trial
court to recalculate the child support according to the correct guidelines.
STATEMENT OF FACTjS
1.

These parties were divorced by decree entered February 28, 2005, by Judge

Frank G. Noel after a bench trial.
2.

The parties have one (1) child together J namely Hyrum Doyle (DOB

07/29/1996). He suffers from a degenerative neuromuscular disorder, which causes muscle
weakness, so he wears leg braces. He also has a communibation and learning disorder, and
has been in special education classes since age 4. (TranscHpt, hereafter "T" p. 36-37) The
Decree of Divorce awarded Douglas Doyle sole legal and physical custody of the minor child
and also ordered "in the event Respondent (Robin) relocates to the Salt Lake Valley, the
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parties will have joint legal andphysical custody and shall share time equally on alternating
weeks and on holidays as per standard schedule" (Decree of Divorce, ^[2, Addendum I)
3.

On May 27, 2005, Respondent filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment and

Petitioner had earlier filed a Motion for New Trial. These matters were heard by Judge Deno
Himonas on July 18,2005, who denied the Motion for New Trial and granted the Motion for
Relief from Judgment based on a finding that the "change of custody requires notice in a
hearing and cannot occur automatically upon a specified event." (Order on Respondent's
Motion for New Trial, Respondent's Motion for Litigation Bond and Petitioner's Motion for
Relief from Judgment, entered January 11, 2006, Addendum II)
4.

The Court clarified that the custody award should remain as sole legal and

physical custody with Petitioner Doug Doyle and "any request to modify the custody award
must be made by Petition to modify the Divorce Decree." (Addendum II)
5.

Relying on the Decree provision that she would be granted joint legal and

physical custody and equal parent-time if she returned to Salt Lake, the Respondent moved
from Denver to Salt Lake City on May 9, 2005 and gave up her job teaching science as an
adjunct faculty member at Front Range Community College. (T. 25,29) She moved to an
apartment across the street from the child's school which is Woodrow Wilson Elementary,
where he attended 4th grade. Since that time, she shared equal parent-time in the summer and
filed a Motion for Temporary Orders to clarify the parent time and custody status. That
Motion was heard by the Domestic Relations Commissioner on November 16, 2005, who
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ruled that the sole custody order should continue for Mr. D|oyle and that the parties should
"share equal time with the minor child on a seven day rotating basis." The Commissioner
reasoned that the parent-time award in the Decree was separately stated from the custody
terms, which were set aside by the Order of Judge HimonasJ and was further consistent with
the findings as to the parenting functions and abilities of th& parties found by the trial court.
The Commissioner further ordered that the child's school should not be changed unless both
parties agreed. (Order on Motion for Temporary Orders, January 23,2009 - Addendum III)
6.

The court ordered a custody evaluation be performed by Valerie Hale, Ph.D.,

and Dr. Hale issued her report May 7, 2007, which recommended the following:
•

Robin Doyle be the sole legal and physical custodian of Hyrum Doyle.

•

Hyrum should visit his father accordingg to the statewide Standard
Visitation Schedule, with the exception that the child spends the night
with his father during the midweek visitj.
If Robin relocates to Colorado, it is recommended that Hyrum visit his
father in accordance with the Utah Relocation Schedule.

7.

•

It is recommended that Hyrum continue psycho-therapy with his
psychologist Dr. Merrill Kingston.

•

It is recommended that Douglas Do^le enter psycho-therapy with a
qualified psychotherapist to assist him in understanding the effect of his
interpersonal behavior on others, incluaing Hyrum.

The court held a bench trial on Mrs. Doyle's Petition to Modify October 2

and 3,2007. The child was represented by private GAL, Klim Luhn. In advance of trial, Mr.
Doyle moved the court to bifurcate the trial into separate Bearings, first to address whether
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the Petition to Modify met the standard of substantial material change in circumstances, and
second, to consider the child's best interests. The court granted this Motion in part and
denied it in part. The court agreed that a 2-step process must take place, but disagreed with
Mr. Doyle's insistence on separate hearings. The court concluded that judicial economy was
best served by having all evidence presented during two (2) sequential days of trial, although
the two (2) issues would be considered separately and in the order dictated by law. This
process is well stated in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by the court.
(Addendum III, Findings •fts 1-3)
Before trial, the court also addressed various Motions in Limine brought by Mr.
Doyle. One motion sought to exclude Dr. Hale's custody report, based on the fact that the
report contained information on the issue of "best interests." The court denied the motion
based on its ruling on the bifurcation issue. Mr. Doyle also motioned the court to continue
the trial, which was denied.
8.

Mrs. Doyle presented evidence as to the substantial material change of

circumstances in the case on the first day of trial. She testified that since the divorce, the
child had greatly increased anxiety and she began taking him to counseling, which Mr. Doyle
opposed; (T. 34, 35) that Mr. Doyle insisted on making 1-hour minimum phone calls to
Hyrum, despite his age and physical discomfort at such long calls; (T. 37,3 8) that Mr. Doyle
had had 5-6 different jobs since trial (which was an area of stability concern to the divorce
court); (T. 40) that Mr. Doyle had disciplined the child so harshly that it left a hand-print on
the child, that he spanked him, threatened to punch him, and on one occasion when the child
-7-

was shaken by the father, he called to inform the evaluatoil, Dr. Hale; (T. 40-45) that Mr.
Doyle took the child out of special education classes and speech therapy classes, which he
needed; that he had excluded her from the IEP process J and alienated the school and
administrators with his demands. (T. 48-49)
9.

Dr. Hale also testified as to material changes since the Decree, confirming that

in the child's initial interview he was "immature and distressed," (T. 66) that he wanted
substantially more time with his mother(2 out of 3 weeks), ( t . 67) that he wanted to live with
his mother in Colorado, but that feeling was "top secret;" (T.| 69) that he was "punished a lot"
and said that "at my dad's, I feel like I am behind bars, I cattrt say a lot of things, he yells at
me...;" (T. 69)

that Mr. Doyle defended his use of ^n^nking the child despite the

recommendations by the divorce court and Dr. Hale no^ to spank; (T. 74-75) that her
meetings with school personnel confirmed Mr. Doyle interfered in the teaching of his son,
barred the school from giving information to the mothpi, and was so aggressive and
threatening to personnel to require police to be on standby; (T. 83-89) that Hyrum felt
pressured and had difficulty doing homework with his father, but that his mother was able
to get him to do his homework with less stress, (T. 70) that his mother helped him buy gifts
for his father, but his father would not help him buy gifts foi his mother, (T. 71) that he often
does not want to go back to his father's home, but that he riever does not want to go back to
his mother's home, (T. 71-72) that he fights frequently wi[th his father, gets frustrated, and
has to punch a pillow. (T. 73)
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10.

At the beginning of the second day of trial, the court stated its findings that the

threshold showing of a substantial, material change in circumstances had been met by Mrs.
Doyle. (T. 254) The court specifically allowed Mr. Doyle to present additional information
on the issue of substantial material change of circumstances when it was time for his case
presentation. (T.313) At the conclusion of the second day of trial, the court reaffirmed its
previously announced determination that substantial material change of circumstances had
indeed occurred that were unforeseen at the time of the Decree. (T. 478-483) The court also
announced its findings and judgment on the issue of what custodial arrangement would best
serve the child's interests.
11.

The Findings in the original divorce trial noted Mr. Doyle's rigid and harsh

disciplinary methods with respect to both his wife Robin and the child Hyrum. Judge Noel
noted that the Petitioner exercised control over Robin, her activities and relationships; and,
as to the child, Judge Noel referenced one incident prior to May 2003, in which Mr. Doyle
slapped Hyrum and verbally abused the child, but believed he had "'improved his parenting."
(Findings of Judge Noel fs 7, 8, 10 - Addendum I)
12.

Despite these findings, Judge Noel left the primary care with Mr. Doyle and

stated his principal reason was not to disrupt an environment in which the child was doing
well. It is also apparent that the Judge believed both parents to be equally capable of
parenting the child, as shown by his ruling that the parties would share joint legal and
physical custody if Robin returned to Salt Lake County. (Findings of Judge Noel, Tfl 1)
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13.

It was undisputed that when Robin moved badk to Salt Lake in May 2005 the

parties began sharing equal time with the minor child. (T. 25 26) Based on a motion brought
by Mrs. Doyle, the Commissioner held a hearing November 16, 2005, and made this timesharing the temporary order of the court pending modification. Specifically, the court
ordered the parties to share equal time with the child on a [7-day rotating basis. (Order on
Motion for Temporary Orders - Addendum III)
14.

School personnel testified that in March 2006 Mr. Doyle discontinued the

child's participation in special education and resource classes, and twice attempted to move
the child to a different school. These actions were expressly against the recommendation of
the Commissioner's Order on Temporary Matters and were opposed by the school personnel,
who confirmed that the child continued to need academic support to remain on grade level.
These witnesses also testified that the child was socially isolated and that Mr. Doyle had
disrupted the educational setting by inappropriately confronting teachers and threatening
litigation. (Testimony of Debbie White, 5th grade teacher! T. 164, 166-168) Ms. White
testified to numerous critical emails from Mr. Doyle, such {hat she felt it necessary to copy
all emails and communications with Mr. Doyle to the principal, based on his anger and
threats to her over minor matters. (T. 171-173)
15.

The school witnesses also testified that on the 5tn Grade Criteria Reference Test

(CRT) Hyrum was not on grade level in science and language (T. 175-176).
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16.

Hyrum's 4th Grade teacher, Mrs. Butterfield, testified that Mr. Doyle removed

his son from special education services, which impacted his work and abilities in her class
in a negative way. (T. 181-182) She also testified to conflicts with Mr. Doyle, including
lengthy conversations during class time, which disrupted her teaching. She had very positive
statements about Mrs. Doyle, who was a regular volunteer in her class. She confirmed that
Hyrum was working below grade level in all four (4) core subject areas. (T. 187-188)
17.

The mother had put the child in therapy with Laura Clark, LCSW, in June

2005, but the father discontinued this therapy after Ms. Clark wrote a letter with which he
disagreed. The Court found the mother a much better advocate for the child's psychological
and social development needs and, by contrast, that the father had very limited understanding
in these areas. (T. 34, 209-210)
18.

Testimony was receivedfromthe special education teacher, Ms. Droubay, who

testified the child had been in special education classes since age 4, and that testing
confirmed he continued to need these services. (T. 190-193) She participated in a meeting
with Mr. Doyle where all staff members confirmed that Hyrum needed continuing special
services, and where Mr. Doyle said that he could personally provide any extra support to the
child at home without school help (T. 200-202). She further testified that Mr. Doyle was
insistent that no school records be given to the mother and that she not be present at any
meetings about the child. (T. 203)
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19.

In reporting the results of her evaluation, Dr. Hale indicated that Mr. Doyle's

rigidity and behavior suggested a diagnosis of obsessive/compulsive personality disorder. (T.
123-130) Mr. Doyle presented the testimony from his expert Dr. Mejia, who disagreed with
this diagnosis. The court specifically found that there was no need for a diagnosis and that
other evidence was substantially in favor of the mother having custody, and the court gave
little weight to the psychological labels. (Findings ^}s 15-16 - Addendum III)
20.

The GAL recommended that Robin Doyle be awarded legal and primary

physical custody of the child. The court gave "great weightf ' to the recommendations of the
GAL. (Findings, ^|17, paragraph 37 - Addendum IV)
21.

The trial court found that Robin Doyle wds the better parent, by way of

character and temperament, to serve as custodial parent, Judge Lindberg relied on the
testimony and report of Dr. Hale to find that Mrs. Doyle was more likely to foster an ongoing
relationship between the child and his father, which had not taken place while the father was
the custodial parent. She noted Dr. Hale's testimony that "Doug honestly feels that nothing
good can come to Hyrum from having him spend time with Robin [his mother]" and u Doug' s
idea of an ideal situation is that after he remarries his new|wife would take over providing
care for Hyrum." (Findings, ^15 - Addendum IV)
22.

The trial court found that based on the tesrimony of school witnesses, the

mother appeared to have a better understanding of the child)r s academic needs and was better
able to support the child's needs in that area than the father. (Findings f 14) The trial court
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found that the father had taken actions to isolate the child and to undermine his needs, such
as taking him out of special education and enrichment programs. (Findings Tfl4) The trial
court specifically found that the mother's interactions with the school were very positive, that
she had volunteered over a period of years and had a good relationship with the teachers, and
was very responsive to the child's needs, even though she had been limited by the actions of
the father to exclude her from the IEP process. (Findings f 13)
23.

The trial court concluded as a matter of law that Robin Doyle had establish by

preponderance of evidence that a substantial material change in circumstances had occurred
not anticipated at the time of entry of the Divorce Decree. She found those changes more
than sufficient to justify custody modification in this case and awarded to Robin Doyle, sole
legal and physical custody of the minor child subject to parent time for the father.
24.

On appeal by Mr. Doyle, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion dated

October 29,2009 where it analyzed the allegations of procedural and legal error committed
by the trial court as asserted by Mr. Doyle. The reviewing Court reiterated that Utah case law
requires a determination that circumstances have materially and substantially changed before
proceeding to a determination of which parenting arrangement is in the child's best interest,
citing the Hogge-Becker two-part test. However, the trial court did not require that evidence
relevant to material change and best interest be presented separately and cited several cases
subsequent to the Hogge-Becker framework in support of this conclusion. The Court of
Appeals also disagreed with Mr. Doyle that the trial court erred in determining that a

substantial material change in circumstances had occurred. |The Court of Appeals pointed
to several specific findings made by the trial court that established material change in
circumstances since entry of the Decree, including: the mother's relocation from Colorado
to the son's neighborhood, the joint custody provision issued |at trial having been invalidated
by post-trial motions, the father's deteriorating parenting skills, the son's deteriorated
educational and social performance and the father's efforts io exclude the mother from the
son's life and the implicit finding that the current custody arrangement was unworkable. The
Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that there had thus been
established substantial material changes in circumstances since entry of the Decree.
25.

The Court of Appeals reviewed Mr. Doyle's argument as to best interests and

found it to be inadequately briefed and thus rejected it.
26.

The Court of Appeals addressed Mr. Doyle's atrgument as to whether or not the

mother's failure to request a support modification in her Pe ition to Modify was fatal to the
trial court's review. The trial court in fact reviewed the child support issue under Rule
54(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and found that Rule along with the trial court's
inherent discretion in domestic cases to be sufficient for modification, which was upheld by
the Court of Appeals.
27.

The Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari io me uiah Supreme Court was

granted on the above-referenced three issues by Order dat^d January 20, 2010.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court made no error in its application of Utah law to apply a 2-step

bifurcation approach in a modification trial and in its receipt of evidence in the 2-step
process. Judge Lindberg clearly delineated the scope of evidence in the first phase of the
trial to present evidence of substantial, material change of circumstances from the second
phase of the trial, where she would consider a broader range of evidence on the issue of best
interests. This issue was raised in the context of written pretrial motions, as well as oral
motions at trial, and the court record shows the trial judge had a firm understanding of the
procedural prerequisites and followed them carefully. She did not limit the presentation by
Mr. Doyle in any category of evidence and prompted him to challenge any portion of Mrs.
Doyle's case at any time. The Court of Appeals made no error in affirming the receipt and
review of the change of circumstances evidence.
2.

There was substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision that

substantial material changes had occurred since the Decree of Divorce to justify modification
of custody. The court made detailed and explicit findings, and addressed the testimony
presented by the custody evaluator, Dr. Hale, by Mr. Doyle's expert, Dr. Mejia, by school
personnel, and the parties. The evidence was, in fact, overwhelming and clear that Mr. Doyle
had taken many steps to undermine the needs of his child in the realm of academics, social,
and psychological functioning, and that he specifically excluded the mother from
participation in school decisions and information. There was also significant evidence that
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the mother had specifically supported the child's need for (counseling, for stability in his
academic setting, and for a positive relationship with his fattier. These were all areas where
Mr. Doyle had specifically failed, and examples were givenl by the witnesses and noted by
Dr. Hale. The evidence presented focused specifically on tjhe functioning of the custodial
parent-child relationship which the trial court concluded w^s aetrimental to the child. The
trial court noted several findings which were clearly unforeseeable at the time of the Decree,
and made other finds where the custodial parent totally failed to meet specific expectations
set out in the Decree of Divorce. The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed these numerous
findings as sufficient to meet the Hogge-Becker test and reopen the issue of custody.
3.

The trial court modified the child support order in this case and Mr. Doyle

appealed that the trial court did not have the authority to modify support as there was
inadequate notice to the parties and inadequate opportunity for Petitioner to be heard on the
issue. Specifically, the mother had not requested a specific child support modification in her
Petition for Modification of Custody. Despite these challenges, the trial court held that under
Rule 54(c)(1), that she had authority to address the issue o child support even if it had not
been directly demanded in the pleadings. The Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed the
support modification. The Supreme Court should similarly affirm this result as the trial court
had adequate information to review and determine the issue of child support. The trial court
had requested additional briefing on the issue and was fully informed by way of financial
declarations on file and briefs. Rule 54 also directly addresses the trial court's discretion in
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this area by stating that "every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in
whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in its
pleadings." There was simply no error by the trial court or Court of Appeals in the
application of law on the issue of child support in this case.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT TO AFFIRM THE
TRIAL COURT'S PROCEDURE TO NOT FORMALLY BIFURCATE
THE RECEIPT OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO CHANGE OF
CIRCUMSTANCES AND BEST INTERESTS,
The Court of Appeals correctly and fully outlined the Utah legal framework

to modify custody which requires a determination that circumstances since the Decree, have
materially and substantially changed before proceeding to a determination of what parenting
arrangement is in the best interest of the child. This is known as the Hogge-Becker analysis.
The custody determination in this case was litigated at a divorce trial before Judge Noel in
December 2004. Similarly, the case of Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982) also
involved a litigated custody decree. In addressing modification of such a Decree, the trial
court is required to receive evidence only as to the nature and materiality of changed
circumstances on which the earlier award of custody was based and the court must make a
separate finding as to whether that burden of proof has been met. If so, the Court "either in
a continuation of the same hearing or in a separate hearing, will proceed to the second step.
The Court may then hold a de novo hearing as to which custody arrangement will serve the
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best interest of the child and either modify or refuse to modify the Decree accordingly." Id.
Hogge at 54.
Cases subsequent to Hogge have refined this test m several ways. In Becker
v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608 (Utah 1984), the Court held that a party must show that an asserted
change "is significant in relation to the modification soijght [and] the asserted change
therefore have some material relationship to and substantial leffect on parenting ability or the
functioning of the presently existing custodial relationship 'Wat 610.
In the case of Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 624 (Utah 1987), the Supreme
Court cautioned against a rigid application of the changed circumstances requirement stating
that preserving a destructive parent/child relationship coum r%e very damaging to tne interest
of a child. The Kramer Court stated:
"No good, however can come from preserving stability in a
parent/child relationship that is destructive, especially when
another parent might have a positive influence on the child. The
nature of the parent/child relationship may never be discovered
by the trial judge if he or she rigidly limits a hearing for a
change in custody to determining whether there are changed
circumstances, without any regard for how well the child is
doing under the established custody relationship. Focusing only
on the alleged changed circumstances and one or the other of the
parents may result in great harm to the child. That does not
mean that a change of custody should be made when it is shown
that one parent is marginally better than another, but it does
mean that a trial judge should not focus exclusively on factors
apart from the best interest of the child and ignore all evidence
pertaining to a child's welfare in a hearing on changed
circumstances." Kramer at 628.
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In addressing this issue in the instant case, the Court of Appeals discussed the
case of Huish v. Munro, 191 P.3d 1242 (Utah App. 2008). In that case, the Decree awarded
joint legal custody to the parents and the father filed a Modification Petition and prevailed
in the trial court. The mother appealed based on denial of due process, among other issues
and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's change of custody. In that decision, the
Court of Appeals stated that the principal served by the changed circumstances rule are
two-fold: stability for the child and advancing the sound policy favoring finality of
judgments. However, the Court of Appeals also noted the holding in Elmer v. Elmer, 776
P.2d 599 (Utah 1989) that "the res judicata aspect of the rule must always be subservient to
the best interest of the child." Elmer at 603. Important in the Huish case is that the initial
custody order was only in effect for eight months, which the reviewing court concluded was
not entitled to as much weight as a similar arrangement of substantial duration - a direct
parallel to the facts in Doyle. In Huish, the appellate court also affirmed the trial court's
wide discretion in controlling the mode and order of presentation of evidence where the
Court of Appeals held there was:
u

no error with the Court's decision to hear evidence of both changed
circumstances and best interest simultaneously, provided it kept its analysis
appropriately bifurcated. And indeed, the Court made its best interest
determination only after it first found that there existed a change in
circumstances warranting best interest analysis. Ultimately, it is the
bifurcation of the analysis - not the literal bifurcation of the proceedings that
matters." Huish at 1250.
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In its opinion in the Doyle case, the Court of Appeals! also referenced the decision in
Walton v. Walton, 814 P.2d 619 (Utah App. 1991). In Walton, the Divorce Decree gave
custody to the mother and the father filed a modification petition alleging three grounds: that
he had moved from a condominium to a house, that the mother had moved from a house to
an apartment, that at the time of the Decree, the mother was unemployed and was now a
student, that a custody evaluation recommended custody to the father. The trial court denied
the Petition to Modify based on the failure by the father to show substantial material change
in circumstances. Importantly, the trial court received into evidence, the custody evaluation
report and allowed the evaluator to testify. The Court ojf Appeals found this approach
acceptable and stated "moreover, a trial court's decision to merge the best interest of the
child into the changed circumstances test is particularly justified when 'the initial custody
award is premised on a temporary condition, a choice between marginal custody
arrangements, a default Decree, or similar exceptional criteria/ Maughan v. Maughan, 770
P.2d 156 at 160. Just as in the Doyle trial court decision by Judge Lindberg, the trial court
in Walton extracted from the merged evidence, distinct, well-reasoned findings on whether
material change circumstances had been established and in that case, ended the inquiry to
deny the modification petition. Again, this decision exemplifies the necessary discretion
which should rest with the trial court in the taking oi evidence concerning changed
circumstances and the best interest of the child in deciding whether there have been
substantial changes and circumstances. The Court of Appeals in Doyle, rejected the father's
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contention that the evidence on changed circumstances and best interests should have been
separated more than it was at trial and stated "in fact, the duplicative and overlapping nature
of this evidence lend support to the trial court's decision to hear all the evidence together, so
as to not waste resources of the court, the parties or the witnesses." Court of Appeals'
Opinion *|14. The trial court was also mindful of the unusual status of this case, resulting
from the earlier striking of the joint custody provision after the mother's relocation in
reliance thereon, the son's rapidly worsening disabilities and the Divorce Decree's clear
preference that mother be a part of son's life to the fullest extent possible. Court of Appeals'
Opinion, ^[14. Lastly, the opinion explicitly finds that "Mr. Doyle presented 'no evidence'
showing that trial court conflated its analysis of the changed circumstances and best interest
issues." Court of Appeals' Opinion, <|14
In attacking the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Mr. Doyle does not point to
any clear error, but speaks only in generalities. He does not demonstrate how merging best
interest and change of circumstances evidence in any way prejudiced Mr. Doyle. Indeed, the
trial court tried deliberately to separate this evidence in its procedural approach to the case
and in its rulings on the two prongs of the modification test.
Mr. Doyle argues that Huish and Walton are distinguishable because they did
not involve litigated custody decrees as in the Doyle case. Despite this challenge, Mr. Doyle
does not show any error in the application of bifurcation principles. Indeed, as stated in the
Huish opinion, unless an Appellant demonstrates that an error is prejudicial, it will be
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deemed harmless and no appellate relief is available. Huishl at 1247 citing State v. Laferty,
20 P.3d 342 (Utah 2001). Indeed, there is no showing by Appellant that the trial court in any
way imposed a relaxed change of circumstances test.
In the first instance, Mrs. Doyle believes thdt the trial court did not merge
change of circumstances and best interest evidence. Rather, Judge Lindberg took great pains
to separate those issues. Nevertheless, there are singular elements in the Doyle case which
provide further support to uphold the trial court and Court of Appeals' findings that
substantial evidence of changed circumstances was properly found as follows:
a.

The Doyle case presented a unique procedural context where the Decree
of Divorce provided for an automatic change from sole to joint legal joint
physical custody which was struck down shortly after trial. This occurred
after the mother relied on the trial court ruling by relocating from
Colorado to Utah. This legal change was| clearly unforeseeable when the
divorce was entered.
The Doyle case was decided by a trial in December 2004 and the mother
relocated in May 2005 and the court awarded an approximately equal time
sharing by order of the Domestic Relations Commissioner made
November 16,2005 (Order on Motion for Temporary Orders, January 23,
2009 - Addendum III). Thus, as in the decision of Huish, the sole custody
arrangement with Mr. Doyle was in effect only a short time and is thus
entitled to less weight.
As reviewed by the Court of Appeals in 1|14, it is clear that the trial court
made no less than eight specific factual findings of substantial material
change of circumstances at the outset of ihe second day of trial. See Trial
Transcript, 255-260.
The Doyle facts fall within the scope of] the Kramer opinion which held
that a rigid application of the changed circumstances test to preserve a
destructive parent/child relationship should be avoided. Such facts were
clearly found on the testimony of the qistody evaluator, Dr. Hale, who
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testified that the child was "immature and distressed", that he wanted
substantially more time with his mother, but that feeling was "top secret",
that he was punished a lot by his dad, that at his dad's, he felt like he was
behind bars (T. 66-69). Further, that Mr. Doyle defended his use of
spanking despite the recommendations by the Divorce Court and Dr. Hale,
not to spank (T. 74-75). That the father had limited contact between the
child and the mother including unplugging the phone and excluding her
from significant school events such as the IEP meetings (T. 259-260).
In summary, there is no question that the trial court, as found by the Court of
Appeals, did a thoughtful and lengthy analysis of the evidence to conclude there was a
substantial, material change of circumstances in this case. There is no evidence presented
by Mr. Doyle that this approach was prejudicial to him and it was indeed consistent with the
prior holdings of the Court of Appeals that there should not be a rigid application of the
change of circumstances test so long as that is balanced by clear findings by the trial court
to segregate the change of circumstances and best interest evidence.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT TO AFFIRM THE
TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION AND FINDINGS THAT A
SUBSTANTIAL, MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES HAD
OCCURRED TO SUPPORT A MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY.

In analyzing whether the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's determination
that a substantial, material change in circumstances justified a modification of custody, a
brief review of those findings is appropriate. The findings are outlined in ^[16 of the Court
of Appeals' decision and include the following:
a.

The original custody decision was based on the fact that the mother was
living in Colorado and the child was doing well in a stable supportive
environment in the father's care (finding at trial held December 2004).
The mother quit her employment and relocated to Salt Lake City within
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6-8 weeks of entry of the Decree in reliancb on the Decree provisions that
if she moved back to Salt Lake, there would be an "automatic" change to
joint legal, joint physical and equal timesharing with the child. Due to
post trial motions, the automatic provisions were stricken and the parties
were thus faced with a new legal interpretation of the Decree that neither
side could have foreseen at the time it was entered.
The original divorce trial judge clearly anticipated that Mr. Doyle's
parenting skills would improve and thit he would adopt less harsh
discipline methods towards his child. In fact, the trial court found that the
father had continued to rely excessively qn corporal punishment.
c.

That when the original Decree was enterbd, the trial judge expected the
child to enjoy stability and success in the father's care. Contrary to this
expectation, the trial evidence showed the child was not thriving, credible
testimony by Dr. Hale, the court appointed an evaluator, convinced the
trial court that the child's level of social educational and psychological
functioning had deteriorated. That at various times since the Decree, the
child had displayed increased anxiety and periously dysfunctional ideation
and behaviors.

d. The Decree contemplated that if either i parent did not foster a loving
relationship between the child and both parents, such as by limiting access
to the child unreasonably, then that parera would not have the best interest
of the child at heart and the court would take that into account in the
future. Testimony from the custody evaluator indicated that the father had
attempted to marginalize the mother's relationship with the child by taking
actions such as unplugging the phone, restricting other contacts between
them and objecting to the mother's partidiDation in the child's mandatory
special needs meetings at school.
The original divorce trial judge also took] steps to insure that both parents
would be a part of the son's life to the| fullest extent possible such as
including the automatic and now invalidated joint custody provision.
f.

The Court of Appeals found that implicitlin the trial court's findings is the
fact that the current custody arrangement had proven unworkable and that
issue itself was sufficient to meet the changed circumstances threshold
and referenced the decision in Huish.
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Based on the above-described detailed factual findings, the Court of Appeals found no abuse
of discretion by the trial court in determining there had been a substantial material change
in circumstances since entry of the Divorce Decree.
In his brief, Mr. Doyle challenges whether some of the findings of the trial
court should be sufficient as substantial material changes as that test has been interpreted and
those were analyzed in detail in Appellee's brief before the Court of Appeals and will only
be briefly summarized here. First, is whether the invalidation of the automatic custody
provision constitutes a substantial material change in circumstance. Clearly, this post trial
invalidation was not foreseeable at the time of the Decree, and was definitely relied on by
Mrs. Doyle in relocating from Colorado to Salt Lake. As a result, the Domestic Relations
Commissioner gave her equal time pending the modification process. Certainly, this status
is more than a mere change of wording in the Divorce Decree as asserted by Mr. Doyle.
Even the judge invalidating the provision, Judge Himonas told the litigants that they should
address the impact of his decision by way of a Petition to Modify clearly noting the
significance of his decision on the expectations of the parties. Of great importance, is the
fact that the automatic custody provision clearly showed the original trial court's finding that
both parents were fit and appropriate for custody and that the mother should be deeply
involved in the child's upbringing if she moved back to Salt Lake. As stated by the Supreme
Court in Elmer v. Elmer, the '"res judicata aspect of the [changed circumstances] rule must
always be subservient to the best interest of the child." Elmer at 776 P.2d 599 (Utah App.
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1988). Mr. Doyle's effort to discount the impact of this lekal ruling in the context of the
divorce and custody decision in this case is clearly wrong and it was certainly appropriate for
the trial court to rely on this decision as part of its finding of material change of
circumstances.
Second, Mrs. Doyle's relocation is a material change of circumstances
especially given the context in which it was made which was in reliance on the promised
legal result ofjoint custody and equal timesharing. The trial judge clearly did not rely solely
on relocation as a change of circumstances and made that clear in her ruling. (T. 255, 256).
Third, Mr. Doyle questions whether his failure "to make parental
improvements" can constitute a material change in circumstances. Mr. Doyle misstates the
actual findings of the Court of Appeals and trial court in thid statement. The original Decree
did not require him to improve his parent skills as much as he Decree expected the child to
continue to succeed in the care of his father. There was undisputed testimony at trial that the
child had severely deteriorated in his social, academic and psychological status. Clearly, the
functioning of the child in the care of the father is a direct correlation and the problems in
that relationship were fully discussed by the custody eyaluator. As one example, the
evaluator and the trial court had cautioned Mr. Doyle not to use corporal punishment, yet he
continued to do so and justified that status at trial (T. 323). Of great significance was the
disruption of the child's school environment and academic needs by his father. The child has
always been a special needs student with physical and mental handicaps. Despite this fact,
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the father insisted that he be removed from special educational services against the
recommendations of those providers. He was also disruptive with school staff and had
clearly alienated teachers and administrators who even felt the need to have police on standby
when he was present. Such conduct clearly affects the custodial relationship and the child's
needs in an extremely negative way as found by the trial court.
Fourth, Mr. Doyle denies that he tried to marginalize Mrs. Doyle's relationship
with her son as exemplified by his unplugging the phone and restricting other contacts
between the child and his mother. Mr. Doyle also prevented Mrs. Doyle from attending
Hyrum's IEP conference in March 2005 (T. 31-32) and requested the school not to provide
her with direct access to the child's school records (T. 358-359). Mr. Doyle argues that these
actions are insignificant as they do not rise to the level of denying parent time. To the
contrary, it is significant that these types of activities were referenced in the original Decree
of Divorce where the judge clearly expected the parents to work together and if it were
shown in the future that a parent did not have the best interest of the child at heart, the court
would take that into account in the future. (Findings of Fact ^[20 - Addendum I) This direct
linkage adds status to each of these separate acts of exclusion and interference in the
mother/son relationship perpetrated by Mr. Doyle. As summed up by Dr. Hale, she stated
"Doug honestly feels that nothing good can come to Hyrum from spending time with Robin
[his mother]" (T. 259-260). Thus, even the expert witness concluded that Mr. Doyle's acts
of interference in marginalizing the father/mother relationship were sincere and purposeful.
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In reviewing the nature and scope of change 01 circumstance evidenced in this
case, the Court of Appeals made no error in its conclusion fn reopen the issue of custody
based on such findings which decision should be affirmed
m.

THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT TO AFFIRM THE
TRIAL COURT'S MODIFICATION OF CHTLD SUPPORT BASED ON
RULE 54(c) URCP

At the Court of Appeals, Mr. Doyle asserted that becadse the Petition for Modification
did not include a specific request for a support modification that any modification made by
the trial court was error. Judge Lindberg rejected Mr. Doyle s argument that the court could
not adjudicate child support. She referenced Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 54(c)(1), which
provides that "every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor
it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings."
She also concludes that in domestic cases the issues of custody and support are so intertwined
that a request to modify custody also raises by implication the question of child support.
Certainly, in this case a change in child support as to the payor would be required when
custody changes from one parent to the other.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial cburf s determination that Rule
54(c)( 1) URCP combined with the trial court's inherent discretion in domestic cases allowed
a support modification in this case. The appellate opinion also cites the Utah Code
provisions that child support shall "follow the child'5 U.C.A. §78B-12-108(1) (2008) which
gives further support for addressing the child support issue in this case.
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Importantly, in this case, the issue of child support at the original divorce trial
had been mishandled and also involved the complex issue of the child's receipt of SSDI
disability benefits. As such, the modification trial court requested supplemental briefs on the
issue of child support, given the complexity of the issues. The Decree and Findings of Judge
Noel made no detailed analysis of child support and, in fact, he issued no child support order.
He did not consider a worksheet or make findings as to what the parents earned or should pay
as child support. Rather, he concluded that the child's SSDI disability payment, received due
to his mother's total blindness, would serve as child support and states in the Decree, "The
Social Security payments paid for Hyrum due to Robin's disability should be used to satisfy
both parties' child support obligations, with the parties having no further child support claim
against, or obligation to each other." (Decree, *|6 - Addendum I)
The only legal authority cited by Mr. Doyle in briefing this point is the case of
Combe v. Warrens Family Drive Ins, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984). That case involved a
corporate dispute between shareholders. The Supreme Court found fault with the use of Rule
54(c)(1) by the trial court which created findings that were not raised by the parties or tried.
For example, that trial court declared that the corporation which was in good standing was
in fact a partnership, and then proceeded to dissolve it when neither party had sought that
relief. The judgment was also rendered as a declaratory judgment when no party sought that
relief Such extreme rulings are a far cry from what occurred in the Doyle case. Clearly, in
the trial process, Mrs. Doyle requested child support and the judge asked for additional
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briefing on the issue. Unlike Combes, this was an issue discussed oy tne parties and tried to
the trial court. Both parties had filed financial declarations in the course of the proceedings
so the court was well informed of the basis on which a child support order could be rendered.
There are many examples of Rule 54(c) being tne platform for relief even if the
party has not demanded a specific issue in their pleadings This occurred in the case of
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 198 J) where the prayer for relief did
not include punitive damages but the evidence established that claim and was granted. In the
case of Palombi v. D&C Builders, 452 P.2d 325 (1969), the court granted an award of
attorneys fees which had not been requested holding that there should be liberality of
procedure to reach the result which justice requires. In the case of Henderson v. For-Shor
Co., 757 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1988) the court held that Ruld 54(c) requires trial courts to be
liberal in awarding appropriate relief justified by the facts developed at trial as long as the
failure to request a particular type of relief does not prejudice the party in the preparation or
trial of the case. In the present case, there has been no argument by Mr. Doyle that his
income was not correctly stated. He was allowed to brief the child support issue and
participated in that process, thus giving him full opportunity to present his view to the trial
court. There was no error by the Court of Appeals in affirming the trial court's determination
of child support in this matter.
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CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals made no error to affirm the trial court's decision not to formally
bifurcate the reception of evidence at the custody hearing relating to change circumstances
and best interest. The Court of Appeals properly analyzed the two-prong test required in a
modification case and acknowledged the trial court's efforts to separate that evidence in a
two-step process. The Court of Appeals also acknowledged in the previous holdings of
Huish and Walton, that evidence supporting changed circumstances is frequently the same
evidence used to establish best interests and that the important part of the bifurcation process
is not to literally bifurcate the hearing, only to bifurcate the findings. The Court of Appeals
had ample and sufficient evidence found by the trial court to support the findings that
substantial, material evidence was presented to support a de novo review of custody. Lastly,
Rule 54(c) was properly utilized as the basis to review child support in this case and no
prejudice has been shown by Mr. Doyle.
DATED this
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Attorney for Respondent/Appellee
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ADDENDUM I

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
DECREE OF DIVORCE,
Entered by Judge Frank Noel, 02/28/2005
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I SALT LAKE COUNTY

ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727
Attorney for Respondent Robin Doyle
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Salt Lake City UT 84111
Telephone (801) 272-2222

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY - MATHE^ON COURTHOUSE

DOUGLAS PATRICK DOYLE,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,
vs.
ROBIN ELAINE DOYLE,
Respondent.

Civil No. 034903528
Judge Frank G. Noel
Comnjiissioner T. Patrick Casey

The court, having entered its Memorandum Decision dated February 10,
2005, being sufficiently advised, enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The parties are married and have one child. Irreconcilable differences
have arisen between the parties and they have been separated since June of 2003.
2. The parties do not own any vehicles. Most of the parties' personal
property has been divided since their separation. Tne parties own no real estate.
3. The petitioner ["Doug"] has disclosed to the respondent ["Robin"] the
existence of two credit cards, a USAA credit card and the Deseret First credit card.
4. After separation, Doug incurred charges on both cards and/or obtained
cash advances on both cards. It appears that there fs at least approximately $11,000
in cash advances taken by Doug on the credit card^ since the separation of the
parties. In addition, the parties had saved approximately $10,000 in bank accounts,
$6,000 of which was taken by Doug on around the time of separation and $4,000
of which was taken by Robin. Doug took approximately S2900 more than Robin.

5. The court finds that each party barely receives sufficient income to meet
their own reasonable expenses and neither has excess income with which to pay
temporary or permanent alimony to the other party.
6. There is a strong bond of attachment between both Doug and Robin
with their minor child, Hyrum. Hyrum is 8 years old and will turn 9 July 9th.
7. Robin has claimed that Doug has abused Hyrum in the past. It appears
that Doug's approach to child rearing is more rigid than Robin's approach. In
addition and beyond that, however, Robin points to incidents of slapping and verbal
abuse by Doug. The court finds that there was an incident of slapping by Doug
prior to about May of 2003 and that there was verbal abuse prior to about May of
2003 in which Doug slapped Hyrum and in which Doug verbally abused Hyrum.
8. Doug has freely admitted his rather harsh methods, but has shown a
sincere desire to change and to use appropriate methods. The court feels that Doug
has indeed grown since May of 2003, and has learned more appropriate conduct,
and continues with the sincere desire to improve and be a good father.
9. Doug points to Robin's periods of instability and depression. The court
finds, however, that those periods of depression and some instability were brought
on primarily as a result of her relationship with Doug, and that his rigid and harsh
approach to their relationship was the cause of many of her difficulties.
10. The court finds that, indeed, there was some abuse by Doug against
Robin in his rigid and harsh methods, and his desire for control over her and her
activities and relationships. The court finds that this abuse probably, indeed, is
greater than any abuse Doug inflicted upon the child. While naturally concerned,
the court feels that the likelihood of abuse directed to the child is unlikely in the
future in light of Doug's sincere efforts and success in improving his parenting
abilities.

11. Indeed, the only evidence before the court is that the child has thrived
and improved while in Doug's custody. The evidencd suggests that the child and
Doug have a loving relationship and the child is now happy and contented in
Doug's custody. The evidence further suggests that he has established a network of
friends and relationships in which he is happy, and that he is actively involved in
scouting and church activities. The court is not inclined, at this time, to disrupt the
child's environment, and for this reason, declines to grant Robin sole physical and
legal custody and instead grants Doug physical and legal custody of the child. If
Robin relocates to Utah, then the parties are awardea ioint legal and physical
custody of the child.
12. It is apparent that Doug's work history is unstable and sporadic. "While
it appears that he has always worked, he nevertheless has changed jobs frequently.
13. The court finds that if Doug is unable to (provide a reasonably steady
income, that may constitute a material change of cirf umstances that could be taken
into account by the court in modifying the decree in Ithe future.
14. The court points out that Doug and his child live in a one bedroom
home and share the same bed. The court feels that as this child is growing older
that that is inappropriate and some accommodation will need to be made within the
next six months, so that the minor child will have hip own bed.
15. The court finds that Doug earns a gross income of $1500 per month
and the testimony is that Doug currently
16. The court finds that Robin eainsj>1000 Iper month from her disability
income, and has the potential of earning approximately $1200 per month in
addition to that. However, the minor child receive^ disability payments of
approximately $590 per month due to Robin's disability, and the court finds that it
is reasonable to allow that to serve as child support and it is reasonable to not
require child support to be paid by Robin should she choose to remain in Colorado.

17. If Robin relocates to Salt Lake County, then the court finds that it is
unreasonable to require her to pay any child support in that event as well, as the
parties would have joint physical custody and share the parent time equally.
18. It is reasonable that if Robin elects not to relocate to the state of Utah,
and in the child's best interests, that Robin be given reasonable telephone visitation
with Hyrum, not to be interfered with by Doug, and it is in the child's best interests
and reasonable that such telephone visitation time be liberally granted to Robin at
reasonable times and for reasonable duration.
19. The court is very sensitive to the problems associated with visitation,
and finds that it will be a very serious violation of the divorce decree if either party
unreasonably interferes with the other party's access to the child, or the other party's
attempts to develop a loving relationship with the child. It is in the best interests of
the child to develop a loving and close relationship with both parents and to spend
equal time in the homes of each parent as much as that is practical.
20. The court finds that if either Doug or Robin do not foster a loving
relationship by the child with both parents for the benefit of the child by either
limiting access to the child unreasonably, or by speaking derogatorily of the other
parent, then the court finds and is of the opinion that that parent does not have the
best interests of the child at heart and the court would take that into account in the
future if any petition to modify the decree of divorce comes before the court, and
the court finds that neither party should speak derogatorily about either parent or
either member of the extended family on either side, regardless of whether or not
there is a sincerely held belief in, or a factual basis for, the derogatory comments.
21. The court finds that there is simply insufficient money or income
capabilities for either of these parties to pay the other's attorney fees and therefore
orders each party to bear their own attorney fees..

22. The court finds that the attorney ror respondent should prepare an
appropriate set of findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree, setting out in
more detail the undisputed facts in this case, and will require these to be submitted
to the court for signature and served upon Doug by Thursday, February 17, 2005,
and finds that the attorney for respondent has fully complied with this requirement.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The court has personal and subject matter jurisdiction and petitioner's
petition for a decree of divorce should be granted on grounds of irreconcilable
differences and should be final upon the signing and entry of the decree.
2. The petitioner ["Doug"] is awarded legal and physical custody. If Robin
relocates to Utah, then the parties are awarded joint legal and physical custody of
their son, Hyrum.
3. Doug must insure that Hyrum has his owrt bed within 6 months.
4. The personal property should be divided as it has been divided, except
that Doug should reasonably return to Robin, in good working order, the computer,
with software and hardware to assist the blind, and with all software, hardware,
printer, display monitors, cables, and things necessary to utilize the computer and
attachments that go with the computer, that were obtained during the marriage.
Doug should further cause duplicates to be made of all wedding and family
photographs and videos that he wishes to keep and to provide those duplicates,
together with all wedding and family photographs mat he does not wish to keep, to
Robin. Robin should reimburse Doug for one-half] of the actual reasonable
out-of-pocket cost incurred and paid by Doug for pausing the duplicates to be
made. The parties should each be awarded their s parate retirement plans, pension
plans, profit sharing plans, and the like, and neitheif party should have any interest
or claim to or in the other's retirement, pension, prpfit sharing, and/or like plans.

5. The parties should be ordered to pay their own debts incurred by them
after they separated and to save the other harmless therefrom. Doug should be
ordered to pay all debts incurred by the parties prior to their separation, except for
the debt on the US AA credit card and the Deseret First credit card, which should
be ordered to be paid as follows. Doug should pay that portion ofprincipal and
interest attributable to the cash advances and charges he incurred/ afterjthe parties
separated. As to that portion attributable to the balance on those two cards on the
date of separation, Doug should pay 5/8 and Robin should pay 3/8, with each
party to save the other party harmless therefrom. In the event either party pays
any portion of debt that is the responsibility of the other party hereunder, the other
party should promptly reimburse that party for all sums actually paid by the other
party for all amounts so paid. In her sole discretion, Robin should be allowed to
make a one-time election within a reasonable time of the entry of this decree to
reallocate the parties' obligations on the US AA credit card and the Deseret First
credit card hereunder by decreasing Doug's obligation to pay on one card and
increasing his obligation to pay on the other card in an equal amount by given
written notice to Doug setting forth that election. The parties should each bear
their own court costs and attorney fees incurred in this divorce action
6. No alimony should be awarded to either party. The Social Security
payments paid for Hyrum due to Robin's disability are should be used to satisfy
both parties' child support obligations, with the parties having no further child
support claim against or obligation to each other. The parties should be ordered to
reasonably support Hyrum and to generate sufficient money to meet his reasonable
needs for food, clothing, shelter, education, recreation, transportation, religious
participation, incidentals, and healthcare, until such time as Hyrum turns eighteen.

7. Until Hyrum reaches eighteen years of agej the parties should be ordered
to reasonably cooperate in providing each parent with as much time with Hyrum in
that parent's home as possible. Each party should be ordered to fully refrain from
any attempt to exercise authority over the other parent or over parent time matters,
and should Robin relocate, to reasonably cooperate in equally dividing the time to
the fullest extent that it is possible to do so. The following minimums should apply,
but these are only minimums, and the parties should:be ordered to try to equalize
parent time. So long as Doug remains in his current 3neighborhood and Hyrum
attends his current school, while Robin lives in Colorado, Robin should be entitled
to at least minimum statutory visitation on the same kchedule that the parties have
been following, except, in any event, Robin should have an uninterrupted six weeks
with Hyrum in the summer of 2005, and in the event she remains in Colorado,
every summer after 2005. She should also have any other reasonable time that she
happens to be in Salt Lake County after having given Doug 24 hours notice. Robin
should be responsible for picking Hyrum up from Doug in Salt Lake County at the
beginning of each visit and Doug should be responsible for picking Hyrum up in
Salt Lake County at the end of each visit that occurs in Salt Lake County and in
Colorado at the end of each visit that occurs in Colorado. The next scheduled visit
after entry of this decree should commence with Robin picking-up Hyrum in Salt
Lake County on March 24, 2005, and end with Ddug picking-up Hyrum in
Colorado on April 10, 2005. Doug should be the payee on Hyrum's disability
check and should retain the entire check amount for use in supporting Hyrum so
long as he remains in his current neighborhood and Hyrum attends his current
school while Robin lives in Colorado. In the event"that Robin moves to Salt Lake
County and lives where Hyrum can reasonably attind his current school from her
home, while Doug remains in his current neighborhood and Hyrum attends his
current school, the parties should equally sharetirr^ewith Hyrum so that each

parent has Hyrum in his and her home 26 weeks out of the year. Absent
agreement to the contrary, the weeks should alternate, with the exchange taking
place between noon and 2:00 p.m. each Saturda)', and with the party who will have
Hyrum during the coming week responsible for picking him up. The parties should
alternate major holidays and each have an extended vacation period with the child
each year. The parties may mutually agree to extend such parent time for longer
than a week only so long as a compensating extension is agreed to and provided for
the other parent at another time or times, so that the overall times remain roughly
equal. It is the intent of the court to place upon the parties the responsibility for
reasonably working together to accommodate each other on parent time and to
ensure that the provisions of this decree are satisfied, and both are should be
ordered to substantially equalize the parent time if they both live in Salt Lake
County in a reasonable fashion without construing anything in the divorce decree as
limiting their right to do so as parents with joint legal and physical custody. If both
parties live in Salt Lake County, Robin will be the payee on the disability check, but
each will share the check amount equally and they both should be ordered to keep
Hyrum in his current neighborhood and school. Unless and until she moves to Salt
Lake, Robin should be granted liberal telephone visitation with Hyrum not to be
unreasonably interfered with by Doug. It should be ordered that neither party shall
enter the other party's home without the express permission of that other party and
it should be ordered that neither party shall use the occasion of picking-up Hyram
to attempt to engage in lengthy discussions.
8. Until Hyrum reaches eighteen years of age, each parent should be free to
travel with Hyrum during that parent's time with Hyrum and, in the event of such
travel, each parent is should be ordered keep the other parent notified of Hyrum's
whereabouts and to facilitate frequent telephone contact between Hyrum and the
other parent while so traveling. At all times each parent should keep the other

parent notified of that parent's physical home address land phone number. In the
event either parent is unable to provide Hyrum with a home or becomes homeless,
that parent should immediately surrender the physical custody of Hyrum to the
other parent until such time as that parent is able to provide Hyrum with a .home*
with/^cpdidlu bcdiuomsfor Hyrum and with a telephone land-line for use by
Hyrum. All provisions contemplated under this paragraph 8 should be decreed to
apply immediately upon the signing and entiy of the decree, except that Doug
should have six months from the date of the decree t<b move.
9. Each year, the parties should calculate theif income taxes both with and
without claiming Hyrum so as to ascertain which patjy will receive the greatest tax
benefit from claiming Hyrum as a dependent and should exchange tax information
by March of each year for the tax returns due April 15 of that year. The party who
will obtain the greatest financial benefit from claiming Hyrum as a dependent
should claim him for that year and promptly pay to the other parent the amount by
which that other parent would have benefited had that parent claimed Hyrum.
10. Both parties should be responsible for the reasonable and necessary
medical expenses for Hyrum until he reaches eighteen years of age. Each party
should reimburse the other party for one-half of such reasonable and necessary
medical expenses actually paid by the other party. Appropriate insurance for
Hyrum's medical expenses should be purchased ana maintained if coverage is or
becomes available at a reasonable cost, with each party responsible for one-half of
such reasonable cost. Each party should reimburse the other party for one-half of
such reasonable cost actually paid by the other partk Income withholding pursuant
to UCA Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5 shou|d be ordered in the decree.

J

11. The divorce decree should vacate and supersede all prior orders.
12. All other remaining matters should be dismissed, including but, not
limited to, contentions about preliminary injunctions and contempt, since the court
is vacating the preliminary injunction and all_conteippt orders as all superseded.
DATED T f f l S ^ f )

DAY OF
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, 2005.

FR^NK G. NOEL
District Judge, Third District <
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A copy hereof was MAILED [prior to signing by the court] to Douglas Eatrick
Doyle, 459 E. 2700 South # 6 SLCE UT 84115,

f 25th &$y of Februafy, 2005.
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Third Judicial District

DATE

ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727
Attorney for Respondent Robin Doyle
17 East 400 South
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Telephone (801) 272-2222
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LAKE COUNTY

-

*

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT -STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY - MATHEioN COURTHOUSE
DOUGLAS PATRICK DOYLE,

DECIDE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,
vs.
ROBIN ELAINE DOYLE,
Respondent.

CM No. 034903528
Judge Frank G. Noel
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey
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The court, having signed and entered findings of fact and conclusions of
law in this matter, now ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as follows:
1. Petitioner is granted a divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences
and separation. The divorce is now FINAL upon signing and entry of this decree.

in

2. The petitioner [?fDougn] is hereby decreed to have sole legal and physical
custody of the minor child, Hyrum. hi the event respondent ["Robin"] relocates to
the Salt Lake Valley, the parties will have joint legal and physical custody and shall
share time equally on alternating weeks and on holidays as per standard schedule.
3. Doug is to make accommodations so that Hvrum will have his own bed
within 6 months.
4. Doug and Robin own no real property,! The personal property is
DECREED divided as it has been divided, except that Doug is ORDERED to
reasonably return to Robin, in good working order, the computer, with software
and hardware to assist the blind, and with aH software, hardware, printer, display
u— - w . B ™H tkmmi Tiftr«s<;arv to utilize the computer and attachments that

go with the computer, that were obtained during the marriage. Doug is also further
ORDERED to cause duplicates to be made of all wedding and family photographs
and videos that he wishes to keep and to provide those duplicates, together with all
wedding and family photographs that he does not wish to keep, to Robin. Robin is
ORDERED to reimburse Doug for one-half of the actual reasonable out-of-pocket
cost incurred and paid by Doug for causing the duplicates to be made. The parties
are each awarded their separate retirement plans, pension plans, profit sharing
plans, and the like, and neither party shall have any interest in, or to claim to, any
retirement plans, pension plans, profit sharing plans, and the like of the other party.
5. The parties are each ORDERED to pay their own debts incurred by them
after they separated and to save the other harmless therefrom. Doug is ORDERED
to pay all debts incurred by the parties prior to their separation, except for the debt
on the US AA credit card and the Deseret First credit card, which is ordered to be
paid as follows. Doug shall pay that portion of principal and interest attributable to
the cash advances and charges he incurred after the parties separated. As to that
portion attributable to the balance on those two cards on the date of separation,
Doug shall pay 5/8 and Robin shall pay 3/8, with each party to save the other party
harmless therefrom. In the event either party pays any portion of debt that is the
responsibility of the other party hereunder, the other party shall promptly reimburse
that party for all sums actually paid by the other party for all amounts so paid. In
her sole discretion, Robin may make a one-time election within a reasonable time of
the entry of this decree to reallocate the parties1 obligations on the USAA credit
card and the Deseret First credit card hereunder by decreasing Doug's obligation to
pay on one card and increasing his obligation to pay on the other card in an equal
amount by given written notice to Doug setting forth that election. The parties shall
each bear their own court costs and attorney fees incurred in this divorce action

6. No alimony is awarded to either party. The Social Security payments
paid for Hyrum due to Robin's disability are DECREED to satisfy both parties'
child support obligations, with the parties having no farther child support claim
against or obligation to each other. The parties are ORDERED to reasonably
support Hyrum and to generate sufficient money to meet his reasonable needs for
food, clothing, shelter, education, recreation, transportation, religious participation,
incidentals, and healthcare, until such time as Hyrum)reaches eighteen years of age.
7. Until Hyrum reaches eighteen years of agd the parties are ORDERED
to reasonably cooperate in providing each parent witn as much time with Hyrum in
that parents home as possible. Each party is ORDERED to fully refrain from any
attempt to exercise authority over the other parent or over parent time matters, and,
if Robin relocates, to reasonably cooperate in equally dividing the time to the fullest
extent that it is possible to do so on alternating weeljs. The following minimums
i

apply, but are only minimums, with the parties ORDERED to try to equalize
parent time. So long as Doug remains in his current neighborhood and Hyrum
attends his current school, while Robin lives in Colorado, Robin shall be entitled to
at least minimum standard visitation on the same schedule that the parties have
been following, except that Robin shall have an uninterrupted six weeks with
Hyrum in her home each summer, starting in the summer of 2005, and shall also
have any other reasonable time that she happens th be in Salt Lake County after
having given Doug 24 hours notice. Robin shall be responsible for picking Hyrum
up from Doug in Salt Lake County at the beginning of each visit and Doug shall be
responsible for picking Hyrum up in Salt Lake County at the end of each visit that
occurs in Salt Lake County and in Colorado at the end of each visit that occurs in
Colorado. The next extended visit after entry of this decree shall commence with
Robin picking-up Hyrum in Salt Lake County oh March 24, 2005, and end with
A
—* 1 l ' n o ™* TVMI^T shall be the payee

on Hyrum's disability check and shall retain the entire check amount for use in
supporting Hyrum so long as he has sole custody. In the event that Robin moves to
Salt Lake County and lives where Hyrum can reasonably attend his current school
from her home, while Doug remains in his current neighborhood and Hyrum
attends his current school, the parties shall equally share time with Hyrum so that
each parent has Hyrum in his and her home 26 weeks out of the year. Absent
agreement to the contrary, the weeks shall alternate, with the exchange taking place
between noon and 2:00 p.m. each Saturday, and with the party who will have
Hyrum during the coming week responsible for picking him up. The parties are
ORDERED to reasonably adjust this schedule in order to alternate major holidays
each year and to give each parent one extended period of several weeks each year
for a lengthy vacation. The parties may mutually agree to otherwise extend such
parent time for longer than a week so long as a compensating extension is agreed to
and provided for the other parent at another time or times, so that the overall times
remain roughly equal, but in any event, Robin will still enjoy an uninterrupted six
weeks with Hyrum during the summer of 2005. It is the intent of the court to place
upon the parties the responsibility for reasonably working together to accommodate
each other on parent time and to ensure that the provisions of this decree are
satisfied, and both are ORDERED to substantially equalize the parent time if they
both live in Salt Lake County in a reasonable fashion without construing anything
in this decree as limiting their right to do so as parents with joint legal and physical
custody. If both parties live in Salt Lake County, Robin shall be the payee on
Hyrum's disability check with both parties sharing the payments equally. If both
parties live in Salt Lake County, they are both ORDERED to keep Hyrum in his
current neighborhood and schooL Until such time as Robin moves to Salt Lake
County, Robin is granted liberal and reasonable telephone visitation with Hyrum
__
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between Hyrum and Robin and is ORDERED to maintain a working telephone
land-line within his home that Hyrum may use to call Robin and to receive calls
from Robin. Doug is ORDERED to give Hyruiji privacy when he speaks by
telephone with Robin and to neither listen to nor participate in such phone
conversations, or limit the ability of Robin to inctlude other family members or
friends in the calls. Robin is ORDERED to refrain from unreasonably making
telephone calls that are unreasonably lengthy oijfrequent,giving due regard to
Hyrum's need to do homework, but if Doug deems Robin's calls to be unreasonable
in length orfrequency,he is ORDERED to fully refrain from attempting to limit or
an any way interfere with the calls, and his sole remedy shall be to try to reasonably
work it out with Robin and, if that is unsuccessful, to approach the court about the
issue, with Robin being given reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be
heard. It is further ORDERED that neither p^rty shall enter the other party's home
without the express permission of that other darty and neither party shall use the
occasion of picking-up Hyrum to attempt to engage in lengthy discussions.
8. Until Hyrum reaches eighteen years of age, each parent shall be free to
travel with Hyrum during that parent's time with Hyrum and, in the event of such
travel, each parent is ORDERED to keep the other parent notified of Hyrum's
whereabouts and to facilitatefrequenttelephone contact between Hyrum and the
other parent while so traveling. At all times each parent shall keep the other parent
notified of that parent's physical home address and phone number. In the event
either parent k unable to pro^de Hyrum wjth a homr with a cop arnte hirriroom for1
Hypim anfLaath-n tnltyhrw fonriJmp fnr ike by TTynimrRfthftr.nmeR homeless,

that parent shall immediately surrender thejphysical custody of Hyrum to the other
parent until such time as that parent is able! to orovide Hvrum with a home with a
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All

provisions of this paragraph 8 apply immediately upon the signiiig and entry of this
decree.
9. Each year, the parties shall calculate their income taxes both with and
without claiming Hyrum so as to ascertain which party will receive the greatest tax
benefit from claiming Hyrum as a dependent and shall exchange tax information by
March of each year for the tax returns due April 15 of that year. The party who
will obtain the greatestfinancialbenefit from claiming Hyrum as a dependent shall
claim him for that year and shall promptly pay to the other parent the amount by
which that other parent would have benefited had that parent claimed Hyrum.
10. Both parties shall be responsible for the reasonable and necessary
medical expenses for Hyrum until he reaches eighteen years of age. Each party
shall reimburse the other party for one-half of such reasonable and necessary
medical expenses actually paid by the other party. Appropriate insurance for
Hyrum's medical expenses shall be purchased and maintained if coverage is or
becomes available at a reasonable cost, with each party responsible for one-half
of such reasonable cost. Each party shall reimburse the other party for one-half of
such reasonable cost actually paid by the other party. In the event that a financial
obligation of one party to the other party under this paragraph 10 remains unpaid,
or any otherfinancialobligation arising under any other provision of this decree
from one party to the other party remains unpaid, income withholding pursuant to
UCA Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5 is hereby ORDERED by this court.
11. All prior orders in this case are hereby superseded and vacated.
12. All other matters not addressed herein are dismissed, including but,
not limited to, remaining contentions about preliminary injunctions and contempt,
since the preliminary injunction and all contempt orders are all hereby vacated.

DATED THIS

FEBRUARY,

FRANK G.
District Judfc;e, Third District
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A copy hereof was MAILED [prior to signing b}[ the court] to Douglas Patrick
Doyle, 459 E. 2700 South # 6 SLC UT 84\l5, tjiis 26thjday of February, 2005.
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ADDENDUM II

ORDER ON RESPONDENT'S MOTIONlFORNEW TRIAL,
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR LITIGATION BOND, AND
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

FliiB B8STEICT COURT
Th rd Judicial District

Steve S. Christensen (6156)
Travis R. Terry (10202)
Hmscffl CHRISTENSEN, PLLC
136 East South Temple, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3156
Telephone: (801) 322-0593
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594

JAM 1 1 2006
By

(ULT LAKE COUNTY
Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE ofl UTAH

DOUGLAS PATRICK DOYLE,
Petitioner,
vs.
ROBIN ELAINE DOYLE,
Respondent.

ORDER ON RESPONDENT'S
MOTION IFOR NEW TRIAL,
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
LITIGATION BOND AND
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RELD2F FROM JUDGMENT
Civil No. 034903528
Judge) Deno Himonas
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey

On August 12,2005, Respondent's Motion for New Tripl, Respondent's Motion for
Litigation Bond and Petitioner's Motion for Relief from Judgment came on for hearing
before the honorable Deno Himonas. Based upon the pleadings] the argument of counsel and
for good cause shown the court enters its

ORDER
WHEREFORE IT IS ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:

1.

Respondent's Motion for New Trial is denied.

2.

Respondent's Motion for Litigation Bond is denied.

3.

Petitioner's Motion for Relief from Judgment is granted for the reasons set
forth in that motion:
a. That the motion was timely under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule
60(b)(6) as it was within 90 days of the court's order which the court
deems to be reasonable; and
b. that any change of custody requires notice and a hearing and cannot occur
automatically upon a specified event.

4.

The effect of this court's order is to leave the award of custody in the Divorce
Decree as sole legal and physical custody with Doug Doyle. Any request to
modify the custody award must be made by a Petition to Modify the Divorce
Decree, uhe Divorce Decree, Conclusions of Law and Findings of Fact will
be amended to reflect this order.

5^7

day o

DATED this

Judge Deno Himon^s
Third District Court
Approved as to form:

Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE!
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing ORDER 0N RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR LITIGATION
BOND AND PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RELDZF FROM JUDGMENT

n1^

was hand delivered on the \Q\ day of August, 2005 to:
Robert H. Copier
17 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

ULMf\cnrs-cli\acriYe fiIes\domesbc relations\doylc\post trial mattcrs\pleading\order on new trial relief from ludement doc

ADDENDUM III

ORDER ON MOTION FOR TEMPORARY ORDERS

FILEI BISTBICT COURT
Th r ro JudiciP) n^tr/ct

SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081
Attorney for Respondent
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
Facsimile: (801) 575-7834

J A : : 7 -, 2006
SAL' cAKt- COUNTY

B>.
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD UDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, StATE OF UTAH

DOUGLAS PATRICK DOYLE,

ORIpER ON MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY ORDERS

Petitioner,
-vsROBIN ELAINE DOYLE,

CaSeJNo. 034903528
Judge Deno Himonas
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey

Respondent.

The Respondent's Motion for Temporary Orders came before the Court for hearing N ovember
16, 2005 before Commissioner T. Patrick Casey presiding. Petitioner was present in person and
represented by counsel Steve S. Christensen. Respondent was present in person and represented by
counsel Suzanne Marelius. The Court considered argument, reviewed the record and file herein and
makes the following recommendation for Court orders:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
1.

Joint Legal and Physical Custody. The parties acknowledge that the hearing held

before Judge Deno Himonas August 12, 2005 resulted in an order that changed the status of joint
legal, joint physical custody stated in the Divorce Decree, to one of sole custody for Petitioner,

although no order has yet been entered arising from that hearing. As such, the Court will not change
the custodial label on a temporary basis as it appears Judge Himonas intended that the matter proceed
through the modification process and that the Court would have a final hearing on that issue.
2.

Parent-Time. The Respondent sought clarification of the status of parent-time given

the procedural record and her status of having relocated to Salt Lake City from Denver. The Court
orders that the parties share equal time with the minor child on a 7-day rotating basis. This result is
consistent with the Decree of Divorce entered February 28,2005 which states that the award of parent
time is equal time sharing on an alternating 7 day basis. The Decree clearly separates the issue of
custody status and the issue of parent-time. The parent-time award in the Decree is stated in
paragraph 2 and provides that the parties "shall share time equally on alternating weeks" in the event
Robin relocates to the Salt Lake Valley. This is also consistent with paragraph 7 of the Decree which
orders both parties to "reasonably cooperate in equally dividing the time to the fullest extent that it
is possible to do so on alternating weeks".
3.

Guardian Ad Litem/Child's Therapy. The Court will appoint a private Guardian Ad

Litem if the parties jointly agree to such an appointment If they do not agree, the Court will reserve
the issue of such appointment for further trial. The Court expects both parties to continue to cooperate
and to insure that the child's physical and mental health needs are met by his current providers.
4.

Contempt. Respondent requested a finding of contempt for Petitioner's failure to

provide equal time sharing after July 23, The procedural history in this case is unclear and the Court
will not find contempt at this time but will reserve the issue for further hearing or trial.

2

6.

Change of School. The parties should not Change the child's current school

enrollment at Woodrow Wilson Elementary unless they both mutually agree to do so.
7.

Restraint on Derogatory Comments and Discussion of Litigation Issues. The parties

stipulated, and the Court orders,

a mutual restraint against ipaking any derogatory or negative

comments about the other parent in the presence of the child andja restraint from any discussion with
the child or in his presence, oncerning the litigation in this case, including choice of school and
parent-time.
DATED this ^ 3

day of ,4cUui^c^

, 20U5.

BY THE COITT^T;

DENO HIMONAS
District Court Judge
Recommendatio;

CJ

imw

uommissio:
Approval as to Form?*""*

Steve S. Christensen
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be sent by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct
copv of the foregoing Order on Motion for Temporary Orders this &> day of
/jZA.
2006, to:

Steve Christensen
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC
136 East South Temple, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3156
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ADDENDUM IV

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
ORDER OF MODIFICATION
Entered by Judge Denise Lindberg, 05/07[/2008, 07/23/2008

FILES DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

MAY - 7 2008

A

ALT LAKE COUNTY

Deputy Clerk

1
DISTRICT
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DOUGLAS PATRICK DOYLE,
Petitioner,
-vsROBIN ELAINE DOYLE,

FIND NGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

CdseNo.
Judge
Commissioner

034903528
Denise P. Lindberg
T. Patrick Casey

Respondent.

f1

On October 2 and 3,2007, the Court held a bench trial onl Respondent's Petition to Modify

the Divorce Decree entered by the Court on February 28,2005. Petitioner Douglas Doyle (Doug)
was present and represented by counsel Steven Christensen and Esrennan Moss. Respondent Robin
Doyle (Robin) was present and represented by counsel Suzanne Marelius. The parties' minor
child, Hyrum Doyle (Hyrum) did not participate in the trial, but was represented by private
Guardian ad Litem (GAL) Kim Luhn. In advance of trial Petitioner moved the Court to bifurcate
the trial into separate hearings-the first one to address whether the Petition to Modify met the
standard of a substantial and material change in circumstance^, and the second one to consider
Hyrum's best interests.
f2

The Court granted Petitioner's motion in part and denied it in part. The Court agreed with

Petitioner that it was required by law to address first whether the threshold standard for granting
a modification had been met, and only if that threshold standard was satisfied would the Court
proceed to determine whether the requested custody modification was in Hyrum's best interests.

However, the Court disagreed with Petitioner on the need for separate hearings. The Court
concluded that judicial economy was best served by having all the evidence presented during the
two (sequential) days set aside for trial,1 although the two issues would be considered separately
and in the order dictated by law.2 Additionally, at the final pretrial conference, and again at the
beginning of trial, the Court discussed with the parties the amount of time that would be available
to each side to present its case.3 Neither side lodged timely objections to the trial time allocation.

l

By consolidating trial time witnesses only have to be called once to appear and testify,
sparing them the possibility of having their regular schedules twice disrupted and saving the
parties additional witness fees. See, e.g., Moody v. Moody, 715 P.2d 507, 511 (Utah
1985)(Daniels, District Judge (concurring). By consolidating the presentation of the evidence
the Court is also better able to remember all the relevant testimony without having to spend
additional preparation time between separate hearings to review notes and refresh its recollection
of the facts.
2

At a pretrial hearing the Court had addressed various motions in Limine brought by
Petitioner. One of the motions sought to exclude Dr. Hale's custody evaluation report on the
basis that the information in the report went to the issue of "best interests" and should not be
considered at the initial phase of the custody modification trial. The Court denied the motion
based on its prior ruling on the bifurcation issue. Petitioner then moved to continue the trial,
which motion the Court also denied. The Court indicated it would address specific objections to
the evidence as they arose.
3

The Court informed counsel that trial would begin at 9:00 a.m. each day, there would be
a mid-morning and mid-afternoon break (each of which would be approximately 15 minutes in
duration), a lunch break of approximately one hour, and the Court would recess each day
between 4 and 4:30 p.m. in order to handle other matters. Based on those break and recess
periods, each side would have approximately five (5) hours of time to present their case. The
GAL was allocated one (1) hour of trial time). Throughout the trial the Court kept the parties
informed as to the amount of time remaining to them. Although the Court extended the time
allotted to counsel by shortening or eliminating the normal mid-morning and mid-afternoon
breaks and by limiting the lunch periods significantly, Petitioner's counsel objected that they had
been denied the opportunity to present all the evidence they desired. The Court rejects counsels'
claim. Having been given fair warning of the time limitations, Petitioner' counsel made tactical
decisions about how they wished to present their case and where they would spend their time.
Moreover, by announcing its determination on the threshold issue at the beginning of the second
2

f3

After considering the evidence adduced during the first day, the Court opened the second

day of trial by stating the reasons why it was satisfied that the threshold showing of a substantial
and material change in circumstances had been met. Petitioner nj)ted his objection on the grounds
that he had not had adequate opportunity to challenge Respondent's case. In response the Court
stated it would treat its judgment on this issue as "preliminary," ^nd Petitioner was free to present
whatever other evidence he wished the Court to consider.4
Tf4

At the conclusion of the second day of trial the Court reaffirmed its previously announced

determination that a substantial and material change of circumstances had indeed occurred which
was not anticipated at the time the Decree was entered. The Court also announced its findings and
judgment on the issue of what custodial arrangement would best serve Hyrum's interests. At the
Court's request Respondent's counsel prepared proposed Findilngs of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Decree of Modification, and forwarded the same to opposing counsel. Petitioner lodged
numerous objections which the Court has considered. After reviewing the trial record, the exhibits
and testimony adduced at trial, and the arguments and objections of counsel, the Court is fully
advised. As more fully set forth below, the Court enters its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,

day, the Court hoped to expedite matters and to free counsel to bcus on the more critical issue of
the child's best interest. To the extent that counsel failed to he^d the Court's warnings, misallocated time and, as a result, did not cover all the issues they intended to cover, responsibility
for those choices lies with them rather than with the Court.
4

After ruling on the existence of substantial, material change of circumstances,
Petitioner's counsel made an oral motion for mistrial. The Cojrt denied the motion. Counsel for
Petitioner then made an oral motion to stay the ruling of the Coiirt; that motion was also denied.
The Court directed the parties to continue their evidentiary presentation to prove the elements
required for the custody modification and defense. The trial continued thereafter on the issue of
best interests and Petitioner's defense to the Petition.
3

and Decree. Before doing so, however, the Court digresses briefly to explain the background and
unusual posture of this case.
BACKGROUND
f5

These parties were married in September 1995. They separated in June 2003.

Following a divorce trial held December 13 and 14, 2004, Judge Frank Noel entered Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce on February 28, 2005.
f6

The parties' son, Hyrum, was born July 29, 1996. He suffers from a peripheral nerve

disorder known as "Charcot Marie Tooth Syndrome," which cause patients slowly to lose
normal use of their extremities due to muscle and nerve degeneration. Hyrum has also
exhibited other learning and speech delays, and began receiving special education services
through the Salt Lake School District in preschool, at age 3.
f7

At the time the Divorce Decree was entered Robin was living in Colorado; Hyrum was

in Salt Lake in the custody of his father. In his Findings of Fact accompanying the Divorce
Decree Judge Noel noted that Doug's rigid and harsh methods with respect to both Robin and
Hyrum had resulted in "some abuse" to both. With respect to Robin, Judge Noel noted Doug
had sought to exercise control over Robin, her activities and relationships. With respect to
Hyrum, Judge Noel expressly referenced one incident prior to May 2003 "in which Doug
slapped Hyrum and in which Doug verbally abused Hyrum." Findings of Fact, f7.
Nevertheless, Judge Noel concluded that since the time of that incident Doug had "grown" and
had shown a "sincere desire to improve and be a good father." Id at f 8. Judge Noel further
found that Doug and Hyrum shared a loving relationship, that Hyrum had "thrived" in his
father's care, and was "happy and contented in Doug's custody." Id. at \\ 1. Judge Noel stated:
4

"The evidence further suggests that [Hyrum] has established a network of friends and
relationships in which he is happy, and that he is actively involved in scouting and church
activities." Based on these findings Judge Noel determined that JDoug should be awarded sole
legal and physical custody of Hyrum. But, Judge Noel's Decreel also provided that "[i]n the
event [Robin] relocates to the Salt Lake Valley, the parties will have joint legal and physical
custody and shall share time equally on alternating weeks and 01(1 holidays as per standard
schedule." Decree, at Tf2,
^[8

It is evident from Judge Noel's findings of fact that nis principal reason ror awarding

custody as he did was so as not to disrupt an environment in which Hyrum was happy and
thriving. It is also apparent that Judge Noel believed Robin ana Doug were equally capable of
meeting Hyrum 5 s needs, as evidenced by the fact that the Decree anticipated the two would
share joint legal and physical custody of Hyrum if Robin returned to Salt Lake County.
f9

Given the rationale adopted by Judge Noel in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law in support of the Divorce Decree, and the anticipated opportunity to share custody of
Hyrum if she returned to Utah, Robin gave up her job in Denver, where she was teaching
science as an adjunct faculty member at Front Range Community College. Robin relocated to
Salt Lake City on May 9, 2005, moving to an apartment across the street from Hyrum's
elementary school (Woodrow Wilson Elementary) where he was attending the 4th grade,
f 10

Shortly thereafter, on May 27, 2005, Robin filed a Motion for a New Trial. Doug had

earlier filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment. In the interim Judge Noel had retired from
the Court and his caseload had been assigned to Judge Deno Himonas. On August 12, 2005,
Judge Himonas held a hearing on the parties' respective motions. At the conclusion of the

hearing Judge Himonas denied Robin's motion and granted Doug's motion. An Order
reflecting the Court's ruling was entered January 11, 2006.
If 11

Judge Himonas' ruling was based on his finding that the provisions in the Divorce

Decree for change of custody "require[d] notice and a hearing and "[could not] occur
automatically upon a specified event." Judge Himonas' Order explained that the effect of the
ruling meant that Doug would retain sole legal and physical custody of Hyrum, and that "any
request to modify the custody award [would have to be] made by Petition to Modify the
Divorce Decree." Based on the Court's ruling and Order, Robin filed a Verified Petition for
Modification on October 11, 2005.
f 12

Upon Robin's return to Salt Lake the parties began sharing equal parent time; Robin

later filed a Motion for Temporary Orders to clarify the parent time and custody status. That
Motion was heard by the Commissioner on November 16, 2005. An Order reflecting the
recommendations of the Commissioner was signed by the Court on January 23, 2006. Pursuant
to the Commissioner's recommendation the Court denied the request to change custody, but
ordered that the parties continue implementing the shared parenting arrangement without
labeling it joint custody. Specifically, the Court ordered that the parties "share equal time with
the minor child on a seven day rotating basis." The Commissioner determined that the parent
time award in the Divorce Decree was stated separately from the custody terms that Judge
Himonas' Order had invalidated. Therefore, the Commissioner recommended that the time
sharing provisions be enforced, as consistent with Judge Noel's Decree.
fl3

The Court's Order of January 23, 2006 also provided that there should be no change to

Hyrum's school enrollment unless the parties mutually agreed to the change.
6

f 14

On or about March 2006, Robin requested that the Court| order a custody evaluation,

and proposed to the Court the names of two possible evaluators. The Court agreed that a
custody evaluation was indicated and appointed Valerie Hale, Plji.D. to perform it. The Court
ordered that the parties jointly share the expense of the evaluation. In order to have the
evaluation commence as quickly as possible, the Court's order provided that Robin could pay
Dr. Hale's entire initial retainer, and that Doug would reimburse Robin for his obligation of
one half of the retainer; Doug was ordered to reimburse Robin ajt the rate of $100.00 per month
Tfl5

Robin receives disability payments based on her total blindness. As a result of Robin's

disability, the Social Security Administration also pays a dependent payment in the amount of
$614 per month. Paragraph 6 of the Divorce Decree provided tmat the benefit received on
Hyrum's behalf would be allocated in lieu of other child support. At Paragraph 7 of the
Decree, the Court awarded Hyrum's entire dependent payment tfo Doug as long as he had sole
custody. In the event that Robin relocated to Salt Lake County, the Decree further ordered that
Robin would become the payee on the dependent payment, and Ithat the amounts received be
equally divided between Doug and Robin.
f 16

The unusual procedural posture of this case, involving, as u uoes, changed factual

circumstances as well as a changed legal interpretation of how regarding certain provisions of
the Divorce Decree can be effectuated, creates the context in wjiich the Court makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Findings Regarding Substantial and Material Changes in Circumstances Not Anticipated at
Time Decree Entered.

7

f 17

During the divorce trial before Judge Noel, Doug had challenged Robin's fitness to care

for Hyrum on the basis of some serious mental health crises Robin had experienced for a time.5
Nevertheless, this Court is persuaded that Judge Noel's decision to award Petitioner legal
custody was not based on Robin's alleged unfitness. Rather, the Court's decision was based on
the fact that, at the time, Robin was residing and working in Colorado and Hyrum was doing
well in a stable and supportive environment under his father' care. By ruling that upon Robin's
relocation to Salt Lake County she and Doug would exercise joint legal and physical custody of
Hyrum, Judge Noel implicitly rejected the substance of Doug's claims, concluding instead that
both were "fit and proper parents."
If 18

Relying on the terms of the Divorce Decree that provided for automatic change of

custody if she moved back to Salt Lake, Robin informed her employer she would not be
renewing her teaching contract, and completed her relocation to Salt Lake (and to Hyrum's
neighborhood) within six to eight weeks following entry of the Decree.
f 19

The parties demonstrated their understanding of Judge Noel's Decree by the fact that

they began implementing the shared custody provisions of the Divorce Decree even as they
sought to change it.
f20

When Judge Himonas determined that the automatic change of custody provisions of

the Divorce Decree violated Utah law, the parties were faced with a new legal interpretation of
the Decree that neither side could have foreseen at the time it was entered.

5

During the parties' marriage Robin experienced a serious episode of clinical depression
that required she be hospitalized for a period of time.
8

f 21

Additionally, Judge Noel clearly anticipated that Doug's | parenting skills would

continue to develop, and that he would adopt less harsh discipline methods towards Hyrum.
In fact, however, Doug has continued to rely excessively on corpforal punishment to the extent
that, based on Hyrum's reports, Dr. Gardner (Hyrum's pediatrician) felt compelled to make a
child abuse referral to DCFS.
f 22

Although there was insufficient evidence presented to ai ow the Court to find that child

abuse in fact has occurred (and DCFS has apparently not completed an investigation of the
referral) the very fact that Hyrum's pediatrician felt it necessary to make the referral suggests
that Doug has not adopted the more age-appropriate and less halsh disciplinary methods that
Judge Noel expected him to implement.6
f 23

At the time the Divorce Decree was entered, Judge Noel also expected that Hyrum

would continue to enjoy stability and success in Doug's care. Contrary to Judge Noel's
expectations, the evidence presented at trial leads the Court to find that Hyrum has not been
thriving in Doug's care. As more fully explained below, credibly testimony from Dr. Valerie
Hale, the Court-appointed evaluator, leads the Court to find that since Judge Noel entered his
findings, Hyrum's level of social, educational, and psychological functioning has deteriorated.

6

As referenced earlier, Judge Noel found that Doug had previously slapped and verbally
abused Hyrum, but the Court thought that Doug had "learned more appropriate conduct" and
"shown a sincere desire to change and to use appropriate [discipline] methods." See Judge Noel's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at Tff 7,8.
9

Indeed, at various times since the Decree entered, Hyrum has displayed increased anxiety levels
and seriously dysfunctional ideation and behaviors.7
f24

At f 20 of his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Judge Noel stated as follows:
The Court finds that if either Doug or Robin do not foster a loving relationship
for the child by both parents for the benefit of the child, by either limiting access
to the child unreasonably . . . then the Court finds and is of the opinion that the
parent does not have the best interest of the child at heart and the Court would
take that into account in the future, if any petition to modify the Decree of
Divorce comes before the Court.. ..

f 25

Testimony from Dr. Valerie Hale, the Court-appointed evaluator, indicates that Doug has

attempted to marginalize Robin's relationship with Hyrum by taking actions such as unplugging
the phone, or restricting other contacts between Hyrum and Robin.8 As explained below,
additional evidence of Doug's actions to marginalize Robin can be found in his objections to
having Robin participate in Hyrum's IEP, as reported by school personnel. It is also of great
concern to the Court that, in summarizing her findings, Dr. Hale commented that "Doug
honestly fe[els] that nothing good [can] come to Hyrum from spending time with Robin." The

7

See, e.g., note 8 infra Dr. Hale also reported receiving crisis calls from Hyrum during
the course of her evaluation. Although the Court is not altogether clear on the extent to which
Hyrum may (or may not) be in crisis presently, the testimony from both Dr. Hale and Dr. Juan
Mejia (Doug's expert) amply support a finding that Hyrum continues to need psychological
counseling. One of the very few bright spots in the continuing battle between the parents is that
both parents now appear to be supporting Hyrum's involvement in counseling with Dr. Merrill
Kingston.
8

In particular, Dr. Hale expressed serious concerns about Doug's ability to manage
Hyrum as he entered his teenage years-a time when children's psychological task is to
differentiate themselves from their parents. To address these concerns Dr. Hale recommended
that Hyrum continue psychotherapy with Dr. Kingston, and that Doug also consider
psychotherapy with a qualified therapist to assist him in understanding the effect of his
interpersonal behaviors on others.
10

Court finds that such views and conduct are clearly contrary to Judge Noel's expectation at the
time he made his initial custody determination. Therefore, they call into question Judge Noel's
initial judgment that Doug would ultimately prove himself to be an effective and cooperative
parent. As suggested by Judge Noel at f20 of his Findings, parental efforts to exclude the other
parent would be an important consideration for the Court in enteijtaining a future petition to
modify the Decree.
Findings Regarding Hyrum's Best Interests.
^[26

At the trial, Dr. Hale testified at length from her custody Evaluation report, which was

admitted as an exhibit at trial and is part of the case record. Dr. Hale's report carefully
examined the required Rule 4-903 considerations, and her findings were based on an extensive
data-collection effort that involved interviewing the parties, Hyrum, and numerous collateral
sources, as well as examining nearly 300 documents. Based on her evaluation Dr. Hale
recommended that Robin be awarded sole legal and physical custody of Hyrum, and that, with
one modification, Doug be given "standard" parent-time in accord with the schedule at Utah
Code §30-3-35. The modification suggested by Dr. Hale was thM Hyrum's mid-week parenttime with Doug extend to include an overnight stay. The Court relies on, and largely adopts the
analysis and recommendations of Dr. Hale's report as one of the bases supporting the Court's
findings of fact that Hyrum's best interests will be served by modifying the custody arrangement
that has existed between the parties.
f 27

Based on the data she collected and analyzed, Dr. Hale concluded that Doug's attitudes

and actions continue to be overly rigid, judgmental and moralistic, and these patterns of thought
and action are unlikely to change much in the future. According to Dr. Hale, Doug tends to be
11

unduly critical of anyone-whether it be Hyrum, his teachers, or Robin-whose actions he deems
to fall below a certain standard of "appropriate" behavior. Dr. Hale reports that Doug has
considerable difficulty in accepting, or even considering, that others may legitimately hold
views that differ from his own. Based on other trial testimony and the Court's own
observations, the Court agrees with Dr. Hale's assessment.
128

In the course of conducting her custody evaluation Dr. Hale spoke with a number of

school personnel at Woodrow Wilson elementary school, where Hyrum attends. Specifically,
Dr. Hale had contact with (a) Hyrum's 4th and 5th grade teachers, (b) the school's social worker,
(c) the district's occupational therapist and speech language coordinator, (d) the school's
special education and resource teacher, (f) the school counselor, and (g) the school principal. A
number of these individuals also testified at trial. All expressed serious concerns about Hyrum's
circumstances and functioning.
f29

The school personnel confirmed that in March 2006-and against the school's

recommendation-Doug discontinued Hyrum's participation in special education and resource
classes; he has also twice attempted to move Hyrum to a different school.9 The school
9

At various points in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Judge Noel clearly
determined that Hyrum's best interests required that he be able to enjoy stability and
predictability in his school and neighborhood environment. By implication, Judge Noel found
that Woodrow Wilson Elementary provided the necessary environment to meet Hyrum's needs.
For example, at \1 of his Findings of Fact, Judge Noel conditions having Doug retain the
disability payments received on Hyrum's behalf "so long as he remains in his current
neighborhood and Hyrum attends his current school while Robin lives in Colorado." Moreover,
the change in custody anticipated by the Decree upon Robin's relocation to Salt Lake carried
with it the additional proviso that she secure a residence "where Hyrum can reasonably attend his
current school from her home . . ." Judge Noel then reiterates "while Doug remains in his current
neighborhood and Hyrum attends his current school, the parties should equally share time with
Hyrum so that each parent has Hyrum in his [or] her home 26 weeks out of the year." Clearly,
12

personnel also confirmed that Hyrum continues to need academid support to remain on grade
level, and that he is not performing at grade level in science and language. The school personnel
also testified that Hyrum is socially isolated, and that Doug has disrupted the educational setting
by inappropriately confronting teachers and by threatening litigation. For example, the school
counselor, Mrs. Webster, testified that at the time of Hyrum's February 2005 IEP conference she
asked police to be "on standby" because of what she perceived to be Doug's threats. She also
testified that in her interactions with Doug she always arranges to have a third-party present to
witness the interaction, due to her ongoing concerns in dealing with Doug.10
P0

In contrast, school personnel testified very positively regarding Robin's interactions with

the school. They indicated that Robin has volunteered at the school over a period of years, and
has a good relationship with the teachers and other school pers<™np1 Robin is viewed as being
supportive of, and responsive to, Hyrum's needs, but has been njmited in the past because of
Doug's actions to exclude her from the IEP process.11

this was a very important consideration for Judge Noel as he determined what was in Hyrum's
best interest.
10

At trial, Hyrum's school counselor (Ms. Webster), testified that Doug had complained
of a playground bullying incident in which he felt Hyrum had been victimized. Ms. Webster
investigated the incident at length, but Doug was very critical of her investigation and would not
accept her findings as valid. Additionally, Ms. Webster testified that Hyrum appeared very stiff
and uncomfortable in the presence of his father, but was very rqlaxed with his mother.
1

School personnel testified that Doug had insisted it was inappropriate for the school to
involve Robin in planning Hyrum's IEP because he was the paijent with sole legal and physical
custody.
13

f 31

Credible testimony from Hyrum's school teachers and other school personnel establishes

that Doug has taken actions that isolate Hyrum and that are not supportive of his needs, such as
prohibiting Hyrum from participating in certain school enrichment programs, and removing him
from the special education resources for which he qualifies and from which he was previously
benefitting.
|32

Based on the totality of the testimony from Hyrum's school personnel, the Court finds

that Robin appears to have a better understanding of Hyrum's academic needs, and is better
able than Doug to support Hyrum's needs in this area.
TJ33

Despite Robin's documented earlier history of severe depression, Dr. Hale found her to

be functioning very well presently. Dr. Hale further indicated that she saw no indication that
Robin's past mental health issues would be likely to recur. According to Dr. Hale, Robin is an
excellent parent who can empathize with Hyrum and anticipate his needs. She is also a vigorous
but appropriate advocate of action to enhance Hyrum's psychological and social development.
Robin has demonstrated more consistent commitment to ensuring that Hyrum participates in
appropriate therapy. In contrast, the Court is very concerned that at one point Doug withdrew
Hyrum from therapy during a time when Hyrum was clearly experiencing great difficulties.
Moreover, it appears that Doug's actions were driven by his disagreements with Hyrum's thentherapist, without giving due consideration to Hyrum's needs at the time.12 While both parents

12

A therapist by the name of Laura Clark was seeing Hyrum in June 2005. At the time
Hyrum was presenting with a variety of "tics," high anxiety, suicidal ideation, and violent
ideation. Ms. Clark provided therapy services for approximately 10 months, but Doug
discontinued the therapy with Ms. Clark after she wrote a letter (dated March 17, 2006) with
which Doug took issue. See Ex. 15.
14

appear to be supporting Hyrum's present involvement in psychol0gical counseling, the Court
finds that Robin has demonstrated a more consistent track recordlthan Doug in this regard,
f 34

Based on the testimony at trial, the Court finds that Robin is the parent better suited, by

way of character and temperament, to serve as the custodial pareiit. The Court relies on the
testimony and report from Dr. Hale to find that Robin is more likely to foster an ongoing
relationship between Hyrum and the other parent than what Dout would do if the Court were to
make him the primary custodial parent. Illustrative of the testimony that supports the Court's
finding on this issue (and to which the Court gives considerable weight) is a comment by Hyrum
reported by Dr. Hale in the course of her testimony. According to Dr. Hale, Hyrum told her that
"mom helps [him] buy gifts for dad, but dad will not help [him] to buy gifts for mom." By
contrast, the Court is persuaded that if given the opportunity to do so, Doug will continue his
efforts to exclude Robin from Hyrum's life. As Dr. Hale noted in her testimony, "Doug
honestly feels that nothing good can come to Hyrum from having him spend time with Robin."
Elsewhere in her testimony Dr. Hale stated: "Doug's idea of an ideal situation [for Hyrum] is
that after Doug remarries his new wife would take over providing care for Hyrum after school."
The Court interprets Dr. Hale's testimony on this issue to mean ^hat, in Doug's view, such an
eventuality would largely eliminate the need for Robin's involvement in Hyrum's daily care.
^35

In reporting the results of her evaluation Dr. Hale indicap;ed that Doug's rigidity in

behavior and attitude suggested a diagnosis of Obsessive-Compblsive Personality Disorder
(OCPD). In response, Doug presented lengthy testimony from nis expert, Dr. Mejia, to
challenge Dr. Hale's ostensible "diagnosis." The Court need not reach the question whether Dr.
Hale's diagnostic label for Doug is accurate. Indeed, the Court [believes it was unfortunate that
15

Dr. Hale used this diagnostic label because an unproductive amount of time was expended in
attempting to refute it. The Court's determination that Robin is the parent best able to meet
Hyrum's needs does not depend on the accuracy of Dr. Hale's "diagnosis." What is relevant to
the Court are the behaviors and attitudes exhibited by the parties in relation to each other, to
Hyrum, and to others who are significant in Hyrum's world. To the extent that testimony from
neutral witnesses converges on a point, the Court gives great weight to the facts established
thereby, irrespective of labels that may or may not be applicable.
f36

Dr. Mejia also offered opinion testimony regarding Hyrum's desires and interests. Dr.

Mejia testified that his opinion was based on various meetings involving Doug and Hyrum.
Although Dr. Mejia testified he had seen Hyrum on approximately six occasions, he did not
clarify the length of each of those meetings, exactly who was involved what transpired on those
occasions, or what his focus and purpose was in those interactions. Dr. Mejia also
acknowledged that he had not met with Robin (either singly or with Hyrum), that he had not
conducted a custody evaluation per se, and that he had not made any collateral contacts. Thus,
Dr. Mejia's own testimony establishes the limited bases for his opinions. After considering the
opinion testimony offered by both Dr. Hale and Dr. Mejia, on the basis of the breadth of Dr.
Hale's work,13and her analysis of those findings in the context of the Rule 4-903 requirements,
the Court finds Dr. Hale's testimony and report to be more credible and carry greater validity.

13

As documented in her custody evaluation report, in conducting her evaluation Dr. Hale
reviewed over 300 documents over a seven-month period, and met numerous times with the
parties, with Hyrum, and with other significant collateral contacts.
16

f37

The Court has also considered, and given great weight to, the recommendations of the

GAL, who endorses Dr. Hale's recommendation that Robin be awarded legal and primary
physical custody of Hyrum. The GAL, however, has recommended a substantially more liberal
parent-time schedule than the one suggested by Dr. Hale. Specifically, the GAL recommends
that Doug be awarded alternate weekends with Hyrum beginning Thursdays after school until
Monday morning. On the alternate weeks when Doug does not have weekend parent-time, his
Wednesday mid-week parent-time extend overnight. The Court agrees with the GAL's
recommendation and finds it to be an appropriate parent-time schedule for Doug and Hyrum. In
addition, Doug should be awarded standard holiday time schedule. The Court further finds that
it is in Hyrum's best interest to enjoy two weeks of uninterrupted parent-time with each of his
parents during the summer.
|38

The GAL also recommended that the Court appoint a parent coordinator to facilitate

resolution of issues that may arise between the parents in implementing parent-time
arrangements, and that the parties each bear one-half the cost associated with the services of a
parent coordinator. In announcing certain preliminary findings at the conclusion of trial the
Court agreed with the GAL and found that employing a parent coordinator would assist these
parties to work through difficulties that might arise in connection with parent-time issues or
other minor custody matters, thus serving Hyrum's best interest14

14

Subsequent to trial, however, the Court held a hearing Ion March 19, 2008 at which the
parties, their counsel, and the GAL were present. At that hearink|g the GAL modified her earlier
recommendation that the parties engage the services of a parent coordinator. The GAL informed
the Court that since the time of trial, Dr. Kingston (Hyrum's therapist) had successfully assisted
the parties in resolving some disputes that had arisen. The GAL recommended that as long as
Dr. Kingston is comfortable assisting the parties in this manneif, the Court should defer requiring
17

f39

The testimony at trial was limited to the issues of (a) material change in circumstances

and (b) the best interest of the minor child. Respondent's proposed findings of fact/conclusions
of law include certain financial matters not specifically addressed at trial. Specifically, some of
Respondent's proposed findings rely on the parties' verified financial declarations to establish
their respective monthly incomes. Others address the proper calculation of child support
(including Robin's SSDI benefits and/or the dependent disability benefits currently received on
Hyrum's behalf), claims for judgments for child support arrears, for allocation of Dr. Hale's
fees, and for attorney's fees. Petitioner has objected to those proposed findings on various
grounds.15 The Court agrees with Petitioner that, at trial, no evidence nor argument was
presented directly dealing with financial issues. Accordingly, the Court will not address those
issues as part of the present Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law, but will address them
through a separate Memorandum Decision after it has considered the parties' supplemental
briefing.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
^40

The Findings of Fact at lifl-25 of this decision amply support the Court's conclusion

that Robin has adequately established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a substantial and

the parties to secure the services of a parent coordinator. The Court agrees and finds that
implementation of a parent coordinator should be deferred until such time as the present
arrangement fails. At that point, either party or the GAL should be free to bring the matter back
to the Court's attention for action.
15

Petitioner argues that either insufficient (or no) evidence was presented at trial upon
which Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on those issues could be based, and/or that the
Court did not state findings nor take those issues under advisement.
18

material change in circumstances occurred that was not anticipatqd at the time Judge Noel
entered the Divorce Decree in this case. These changed circumstances are more than sufficient
to justify a custody modification in this case.
^41

The Findings of Fact at ^f 26-38 of this decision amply support the Court's conclusion

that Hyrum's best interest will be best served by granting Robin sole legal and physical custody
of Hyrum, subject to Doug's exercise of liberal parent time as referenced supra at f37. In
reaching this conclusion the Court has expressly relied upon, and adopted, the recommendations
of the custody evaluator and of the GAL. To the extent the GAL'|s recommendations modify the
custody evaluator's recommendations, the Court concludes that tpe GAL's modifications are
appropriate and should be implemented.
|42

It is in Hyrum's best interest that the parties adopt a mechanism to assist them in

resolving the recurring disputes about his care that presently contribute to the contention
between them. For that reason the Court initially agreed with the GAL's recommendation that a
parent coordinator should be appointed. Because it now appears that Hyrum's present therapist
has been successful in assisting the parties to deal with some of these issues informally, the
Court has determined that the appointment of a parent coordinator can be deferred. However, if
at some point Hyrum's therapist determines that he cannot (or should not) continue to mediate
informally whatever minor parent-time or other disputes may arjse between the parties, then the
Court concludes that Hyrum's best interests will be best served by promptly retaining a parent
coordinator. If so, either party (or the GAL) can bring the mattefr to the Court's attention for
prompt action. Robin and Doug shall be equally liable for the expenses of a narent coordinator.
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and will need to pay one-half of any retainer that may be required within thirty (30) days of a
hearing at which either the Court orders, or the Commissioner recommends, such action.
|43

Although at the time of the trial the Court anticipated that its determination regarding

change in custody would be implemented reasonably promptly, delays occasioned by the need to
resolve objections to the Court's decision resulted in the parties continuing their shared custody
arrangement. At the hearing held March 19, 2008, the Court heard argument from the parties
and from the GAL. The GAL argued that Hyrum's best interests were not being served by
prolonging the period of shared custody, and urged the Court to enter promptly an Interim Order
of Modification so the custodial changes could be implemented prior to the conclusion of
Hyrum's Easter/Spring break. The Court was persuaded by the GAL's argument and that same
day entered the requested Interim Order. In issuing these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the Court hereby reaffirms its earlier conclusion that entry of the Interim Order was fair,
appropriate, and in Hyrum's best interest.
^[44

Respondent is directed to prepare an Order of Modification consistent with these

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

SO ORDERED BY THE COURT this J_Z_ day of

JUbCiEDEMSEPpS
District Court Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DOUGLAS PATRICK DOYLE,

:

ORDER OF MODIFICATION

Petitioner,

:

CASE NO, 034903528

vs.

:

ROBIN ELAINE DOYLE,

:

Respondent•

:

The Court held a trial on respondent's Modification Petition on
October 2 and 3, 2007.
by

counsel

Steve

S.

Petitioner was present in person and represented
Christensen,

Brennan

H.

Moss,

and

Matthew

B.

Anderson. The respondent was present in person and represented by counsel
Suzanne Marelius. The minor child was represented by private guardian ad
litem,

attorney

Kim

Luhn.

The

Court

heard

testimony

of witnesses,

including custody evaluator, Valerie Hale, Ph.D., considered exhibits,
the record and argument
various

financial

Conclusions

issues

of counsel. The Court
and

drafted

its own

of Law which were docketed

May

7,

reserved decision on
Findings

of

Fact

and

2008. The Court

has

considered supplemental briefing on the issue of proper allocation of the
minor child's social security ("SSDI") payments and child support. These
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issues were addressed in the Court's Memorandum Decision Re: Child
Support and SSDI payments docketed May 20,

200B. A S

described in the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law previously entered in this case,
prior to the trial petitioner moved the Court to bifurcate the trial into
two separate hearings—the first to address whether the Petition to
Modify met the standard of substantial material change in circumstances,
and the second to consider Hyrum's best interests. The Court granted
petitioner's Motion in part and denied it in part. The Court concluded
that judicial economy was best sevrved by having all of the evidence
presented during the two days set for trial, although the two issues
would be considered separately with the first part addressing whether a
showing of substantial material changes in circumstances had been met.
The second part of the trial would focus on best interests of the child
and custody issues associated therewith.

At trial the Court considered

these issues separately and in the order prescribed by law.
Based on the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and written
rulings

previously

entered

in

this

matter,

the

Court

directed

respondent's counsel to prepare an Order of Modification (the "Order").
Petitioner lodged various Objections to the proposed Order. The guardian
ad litem has also weighed in regarding the proposed Order. The Court has
considered the respondent's proposed Order and the Objections and
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comments thereto, and now enters its own Order of Modification SLI
follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
1

The

respondent

has

established

sufficient

change

of

circumstances to modify the Decree of Divorce entered by Judge Frank Noel
on February 28, 2005.

Specifically, the Court has found substantial,

material changes of circumstances have occurred in the custody and
parent-time arrangements of these parties since entry of the Decree,
which changes were not anticipated.at the time the Decree was entered.
Primary among these is the unanticipated change in the custody order from
what was contemplated by Judge Noel's Decree after Judge Himonas'
subsequent review of that Decree. Additionally, there was significant
evidence presented at trial that the child had not continued to enjoy
stability and success of parenting in petitioner's care as anticipated
in the Decree.

To the contrary, since the time the Decree was entered

the child's level of social, educational, and psychological functioning
has deteriorated.
2

Custody and Parent-Time. The Court considered the extensive

evidence regarding the custody and parent-time needs of the minor child
Hyrum Doyle (dob 7/9/96), and for the reasons given in its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court concludes that respondent is the
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more appropriate parent to exercise primary cusltody of the child. The
Court awards to respondent Robin E. Doyle the sole care, custody and
control

of

this

minor

child

subject

to

reasonable

parent-time

for

petitioner. In reaching this conclusion the Court has expressly relied
upon and adopted the recommendations of the custody evaluator and of the
guardian ad litem.
3

The Court adopts the guardian ad litem's recommendations of

parent-time and hereby awards to petitioner Douglas Doyle

alternate

weekends with Hyrum, beginning Thursdays after school and extending until
Monday morning.

On the alternate weeks when petitioner does not have

weekend parent-time, his mid-week parent-time shall extend overnight and
he shall

return

the

child

to school, or

to his mother's

care

the

following morning if school is not in session.
4

Each parent is awarded two weeks of uninterrupted parent-time

with the minor child to be scheduled during the summer school break.
Each party must give the other thirty (3 0) days advance written notice
of the time selected.

At the time of entry of this Order, the standard

schedule of holiday parent-time ordered herein is as follows:
(a)

At the election of the non-custopial parent, parent-time
over a scheduled holiday weekend may begin from the time
the child's school is regularly dismissed at the
beginning of the holiday week nd until 7 p.m. on the
last day of the holiday weekend].
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At the election of the non-custodial parent, if school
is not in session, parent-time over a scheduled holiday
weekend may begin at approximately 9 a.m., accommodating
the custodial parent's work schedule, the first day of
the holiday weekend until 7 p.m. on the last day of the
holiday weekend, if the non-custodial parent is
available to be with the child, unless the Court directs
the application of Subsection 2(e) (ii) (A) .
(i)
A
step-parent,
grandparent,
or
other
responsible individual designated by the noncustodial parent, may pick up the child if the
custodial parent is aware of the identity of the
individual, and the parent will be with the child
by 7 p.m.
(ii) Elections should be made by the non-custodial
parent at the'time of the divorce Decree or Court
Order, and may be changed by mutual agreement,
Court Order, or by the non-custodial parent in the
event of a change in the child's schedule.
In years ending in an odd number, the non-custodial
parent is entitled to the following holidays:
(i) Child's birthday on the day before or after the
actual birth date beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at
the discretion of the non-custodial parent, he may take
other siblings along for the holiday.
(ii) Martin Luther King, Jr., beginning 6 p.m. on Friday
until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for
a lengthier period of time to which the non-custodial
parent is completely entitled;
(iii) Spring break beginning at 6 p.m. on the day school
lets out for the holiday until 7 p.m. on the Sunday
before school resumes;
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(iv) July 4 beginning 6 p.m. the! day before the holiday
until 11 p.m. or no later than 6 p.m. on the day
following the holiday, at the ODtion of the parent
exercising the holiday;
(v) Labor Day beginning 6 p.m. oil Friday until Monday at
7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier
period of time to which the ^^-^"stodial parent is
completely entitled;
(vi) The fall school break, ilf applicable, commonly
known as U.E.A. weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday
until Sunday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for
a lengthier period of time to jtfhich the non-custodial
parent is completely entitled;
(vii) Veteran's D^y holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day
before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; and
(viii) The first portion of I the Christmas school
vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32 (3) (b),
including Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1 p.m.
on the day halfway through the holiday, if there are an
odd number of days for the holiday period, or until 7
p.m. if there are an even number of days for the holiday
period, so long as the enti re holiday is equally
divided.
In years ending in an even nubber, the non-custodial
parent is entitled to the following holidays:
(i) Child's birthday on actual birth date beginning at
3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take cither siblings along for
the birthday;
(ii) President's Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until
7 p.m. on Monday, unless the holiday extends for a
lengthier period of time to which the non-custodial
parent is completely entitled;
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(iii) Memorial Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until
Monday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a
lengthier period of time to which the non-custodial
parent is completely entitled;
(iv) July 24 beginning at 6 p.m. on the day before the
holiday until 11 p.m. or no later than 6 p.m. on the day
following the holiday, at the option of the parent
exercising the holiday;
(v) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the
holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(vi) Halloween on October 31 or the day Halloween is
traditionally celebrated in the local community from
after school until 9 p.m. if on a school day, or from 4
p.m. until 9 p.m.;v
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m.
until Sunday at 7 p.m.; and
(viii) The second portion of the Christmas school
vacation as defined
in Subsection 30-3-32 (3) (b),
beginning 1 p.m. on the day halfway through the holiday,
if there are an odd number of days for the holiday
period, or at 7 p.m. if there are an even number of days
for the holiday period, so long as the entire Christmas
holiday is equally divided.
(e)

The custodial parent is entitled to the odd year
holidays in even years and the even year holidays in odd
years.

(f)

Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive
father every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on
the holiday.

(g)

Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive
mother every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on
the holiday.

5
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The Court concludes that Hyrum's blest interests will be

furthered if these parties avail themselves of the services of a parent
coordinator to facilitate resolution of issues that may arise between
them in implementing parent-time. However, the Court has chosen to defer
appointment of a parent coordinator at this time

On March 19, 2008 the

Court held a post-trial hearing at which the parties, counsel, and the
guardian ad litem were present. The guardian ad litem informed the Court
that since the time of trial, Dr. Merrill Kingston (Hyrum's therapist)
has successfully assisted the partvies in resolving some disputes that
have arisen. The Court

finds

that

so long as this therapist is

comfortable assisting the parties in this manner, the Court will not
require the parties to secure immediately th^ services of a parent
coordinator. Therefore, appointment of a parent coordinator is deferred
until such time as the present arrangement fail|s.

At some future time

Dr. Kingston may no longer be willing to continue his involvement in this
function.

At such time as that occurs, if at all, either party or the

guardian ad litem may bring the matter back to t he Court's attention for
action.

The parties will be required promptly to confer and select an

acceptable parent coordinator. If the parties cannot reach agreement
within one week of being notified that Dr. Kingston is no longer wiling
to continue this service, the parties will then nave one additional week
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within which each will submit to the Commissioner the name and resume of
an appropriate parent coordinator.

The Commissioner will review the

submissions and recommend a parent coordinator.
the parent coordinator.

The Court will appoint

Within thirty (3 0) days of appointment, each

party shall be required to pay one-half of any retainer the parent
coordinator may require. Each party will also be responsible for paying
one-half of the cost for the services of the parent coordinator.
6

Although at the time of the trial the Court anticipated that

its determination regarding changve in custody would be implemented
reasonably promptly, delays occasioned by the need to resolve objections
to the Court's decision resulted in the parties continuing their shared
custody arrangement. At the hearing held March 19, 2008, the Court heard
argument from the parties and from the guardian ad litem.

The guardian

ad litem argued that Hyrum's best interests were not being served by
prolonging the period of shared custody, and urged the Court to enter
promptly an interim Order of Modification so the custodial changes could
be implemented prior to the conclusion of Hyrum's Easter/Spring break.
The Court was persuaded by the guardian ad litem' s argument and that same
day entered the requested interim Order.

In issuing this Order, the

Court hereby reaffirms its earlier conclusion that entry of the interim
Order was fair, appropriate, and in Hyrum's best interests.

DOYLE V. DOYLE
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Child Support and SSDI Payments . Atjthe divorce trial held

before Judge Frank Noel, the Court made a determination on the issue of
child support and allocation of the minor child7i social security (SSDI)
payments.

Respondent Robin Doyle is totally blind and receives SSDI as

a result of her disability and there is also a dependent payment paid
separately on behalf of her minor child.

In tne divorce Decree Judge

Noel gave petitioner Douglas Doyle sole legal andj physical custody. But,
if respondent Robin Doyle relocated to the Salt Lake valley, the Decree
provided that the parties would have joint legal and joint physical
custody and share time equally. The Decree also provided that the social
security payments that Hyrum receives based on Robin's disability would
satisfy Jboth parties' child support obligations and should be equally
divided.
other.

Neither party would have a child support claim against the
After the Decree was entered, both parties filed post-trial

Motions.

The Motions were heard by Judge Deno Himonas on January 11,

2006. Judge Himonas granted petitioner's post-trial Motion, finding that
the portion of the divorce Decree that provided for an automatic

change

of custody based on Robin's relocation to the Salt Lake valley was
improper.

Judge Himonas concluded that a change of custody could only

be made as part of a modification Petition.

Judge Himonas' ruling did

not address the issue of child support or SSDI predits.
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8

Based on that ruling, respondent promptly filed a Petition to

Modify.

The Court awarded temporary sole custody to petitioner and

continued

the fifty-fifty parent-time sharing arrangement

that the

parties had instituted upon respondent's return to the Salt Lake valley.
9

By entry of an interim Order March 19, 2008, the Court changed

custody to respondent Robin Doyle, and awarded her sole legal and
physical custody of the minor child. The Court requested briefing on the
issue of child support and allocation of the SSDI payment.

After

considering the briefs of the parties and applicable law, the Court is
persuaded that the Decree of Divorce contained errors in how it allocated
Hyrum's SSDI payments, and in determining that it satisfied the parties'
respective obligations for child support. The Decree failed to establish
the parties' gross incomes as required by law, and did not establish a
support

obligation

for

each

party

in

accordance

with

statutory

guidelines. The Court also incorrectly credited petitioner with one-half
share of Hyrum's SSDI payments and finally, incorrectly deemed those
benefits to satisfy the support obligation of both parties.

Utah law

clearly provides that when minor children are involved in a divorce case,
the

Court must

establish

each parent's

obligation towards their minor children.

income

and

child

support

Based on review of the

Financial Declaration, the petitioner's gross monthly income is $1,889.60
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per month, and respondent's gross monthly income from salary and wages
is $525 per month.

Respondent also receives another $1,176 in direct

SSDI payments to her based on her disability.

Each party reported

receiving $317.50 as their one-half share of Hyrum's SSDI payment.

The

Court will use only respondent's earnings in the amount of $525 per month
as wages for child support calculation purposes.

Specifically excluded

from her gross income is her separate SSDI payment as required by Utah
Code Ann., § 78B-12-203 (3) (formerly Section 78-45-7.5(3)).
10

The parties agree that tt^e Court should use the Joint Physical

Custody Worksheet based on the parent-time orders of the Court.

The

Court finds that petitioner's time with Hyrum over the period of one
calendar year is 13 8 overnights, respondent has 221 overnights, and these
are the figures

to be used

in a Joint Physijcpal Custody Worksheet.

Applying the child support guidelines to the joint physical custody
worksheet formula, incomes, and other findings ofI the Court, petitioner's
child

support

obligation

is

determined

to

be

$283.94

Respondent's child support obligation is $94.82 per month.

per

month.

Respondent's

portion of the child support obligation must also be credited against the
SSDI amounts

received

on Hyrum's behalf.

Furthermore, pursuant

to

Coulon v. Coulon, 915 P.2d 1069 (1996 UT App) , the SSDI amounts received
for Hyrum in excess of respondent's child support obligation are to be
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used for Hyrum's benefit and petitioner may not claim credit from those
"excess funds."

Rather, they are to be received by respondent and used

by her for Hyrum 7 s benefit as she may determine at her sole discretion.
11

The petitioner's child support obligation is thus ordered at

the level of $283.94 per month.

This obligation shall be effective as

of the date respondent assumed primary physical custody pursuant to the
Court's interim Order of Modification entered March 19, 2008.

This

support shall be due and payable one-half by the 5th and one-half by the
20th of every month, and respondent jnay avail herself of the services of
the Office of Recovery Services to ensure receipt of these payments in
a timely manner.
12

The Court reaffirms

its ruling

in the interim Order that

respondent is to be the payee for Hyrum's SSDI benefits.
13

Health Insurance. The parties are ordered to share equally in

the cost of any health insurance premiums incurred for Hyrum's health and
dental care.

Each party shall be responsible for paying one-half of any

out-of-pocket medical or dental expenses that are not covered by such
insurance.

Reimbursement

for out-of-pocket

expenses

for

the minor

child's health and dental care shall be made pursuant to Utah Code Ann.,
§ 78B-12-212

(formerly Utah Code Ann., § 78-45-7.15).

This section

includes a requirement that a parent who incurs medical or dental expense
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shall provide written verification of the cost an<ti payment of the expense
to the other parent within thirty (30) days of payment, and that parent
shall be reimbursed one-half that verified amount |within thirty (30) days
of receipt of payment.
14

Attorney's Fees.

The parties havel filed Affidavits and

briefing concerning attorney's fees which will b$ addressed by the Court
in a separate ruling.
Dated this

jrVciav of July, 2008.

DENISE P. LIND:
DISTRICT COURT
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order of Modification, to the following, this ^-Jyday of July,
2008:

Steve S. Christensen
Brennan H. Moss
Matthew B. Anderson
Attorneys for Petitioner
136 E. South Temple, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Suzanne Marelius
Attorney for Respondent
261 East 300 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Kim Luhn
Guardian ad Litem
331 S. Rio Grande, Suite 201
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

ADDENDUM V

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: CHILlD SUPPORT AND
SSDI PAYMENTS

Third Judicial District'

MAY 2 0 2008
SALT LAKE COUNTY

J2*puty (Mmh

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STAtE OF UTAH
DOUGLAS PATRICK DOYLE,
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE:
CHILD SUPPORT AND SSDI
PAYMENTS

Petitioner,
-vsROBIN ELAINE DOYLE,

Ca<|eNo.
Judge
Commissioner

Respondent.

f1

034903528
Denise P. Lindberg
T. Patrick Casey

As a result of objections raised to proposed Findings 6f Fact and Conclusions of Law

("Findings") submitted by Respondent following a divorce modification trial in October, 2007, the
Court opted to draft its own Findings, which were docketed May 7,2008. As referenced at f39 of
its Findings, the Court reserved decision on various financial issues until such time as the Court had
considered the parties' supplemental briefing. The Court has now received and considered the
parties' supplemental briefs on child support, and the applicable statutory and case law cited by the
parties. At issue is whether, in light of the Court's determination to grant Respondent's Petition
to Modify the Divorce Decree (the "Petition") and to award sole legal
]
and primary physical custody
to Respondent, the Court should also revisit Judge Noel's determination on the issues of child
support and the proper allocation of the minor child' Social Security ("SSDI") payments as reflected
in the Divorce Decree. If so, the Court must also determine the appropriate way to calculate the
parties' child support obligation. For the reasons given below the Court agrees that the child
il-

support issue needs to be reopened, the minor child's SSDI payments need to be properly credited,
and the parties' respective child support obligations need to be calculated.
BACKGROUND
^[2

Judge Noel heard the divorce trial of these parties in December 2004, and entered his

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Divorce Decree (the "Decree") on February 28, 2005.
^[3

The Decree entered by Judge Noel was unusual in several respects, two of which are

highlighted here: First, although it gave Petitioner Doug Doyle ("Doug") sole legal and physical
custody of the parties' son, Hyrum, the Decree also provided that "[i]n the event [Robin] relocates
to the Salt Lake Valley, the parties will have joint legal and physical custody and shall share time
equally . . . ." Decree, at ^[2. Second, without specific findings establishing each party's child
support obligation, the Decree provided that "[t]he Social Security payments paid for Hyrum due
to Robin's disability are DECREED to satisfy both parties' child support obligations, with the
parties having no further child support claim against or obligation to each other

" Decree, at f 6

(emphasis added).
*|4

Although each of the parties was dissatisfied with aspects of the Divorce Decree and sought

to change it (by Motion for Relief from Judgment filed by Petitioner, and by a Motion for New Trial
filed by Respondent), neither party pursued appellate review. The parties' various motions were
heard by Judge Himonas on January 11, 2006. Judge Himonas granted Petitioner's motion and
denied Respondent's motion. Judge Himonas' ruling was based on his finding that the provision
in the Divorce Decree for change of custody "requirefd] notice and a hearing and "[could not] occur
automatically upon a specified event." He further explained that the effect of the ruling meant that
-2-

Petitioner would retain sole legal and physical custody of Hyrumu and mat "any request to modify
the custody award [would have to be] made by Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree." See
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at ^[10, 11 (May 7, 2d08). Judge Himonas' ruling did
not address how the Decree had dealt with the issues of child support and/or credit of Hyrum's
Social Security payments.
^[5

Based on Judge Himonas' ruling, Respondent promptly filed a Petition to Modify (the

"Petition"). The Petition sought to modify the Decree so the parties would share joint legal and
physical custody of their son, with a 50-50 parent-time sharing arrangement on a seven-day rotating
basis. Alternatively, Respondent asked the Court to award her sole physical custody of Hyrum,
"subject to reasonable and liberal parent time for Petitioner." Petition, at 3, ^[6. The Petition did
not expressly reference the issues of child support, nor the allocation of Hyrum's SSDI payments,
but did include the typical recital of "and such other and fuprther relief as the Court deems
appropriate . . . ." Petition, at 3.
The Court Can Properly Revisit the Divorce Decree Provision lureaiting both Parents with the
Minor's Dependent Disability Payments in Lieu of Child Support.
T|6

Respondent raises various arguments in support of her] position that the Court can and

should grant an adjustment to the child support previously ordered in this case. First, she argues
that her failure to request expressly such an adjustment in the Petition does not prevent the Court
from granting it because "support follows the child." Utah Code §78B-12-108 (formerly Utah Code
§78-45-4.4). Respondent also suggests that the Court can reach the issue because the Petition
included a prayer for such "other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate." Petition, at 3.

-3-

Given the significant change in custody and parent-time ordered by the Court following the
modification trial, Respondent argues "it is lawful and appropriate . . . to alter child support and
medical provisions to correspond with the new arrangements" without further need to establish a
substantial and material change in circumstances directly related to child support. Second, she
argues that Judge Noel's twin rulings that Hyrum's SSDI payments would suffice as child support,
and that those payments should be equally divided between the parties, were wrong as a matter of
law. Therefore she urges that the Court enter a Modified Decree to correct the prior errors and
bring those provisions in line with statutory and case law.1

!

This argument was previously presented to the Court as part of an Objection filed by
Respondent to the recommendations of the Commissioner following a hearing which he held
with the parties and their counsel on October 27, 2006. For reasons more fully explained below,
at the time it ruled on the Objection, the Court failed to focus on, or to consider fully the
Respondent's legal argument. The Court apologizes to the parties for that oversight.
Among other issues addressed at the October 2006 hearing, the Commissioner had
certified for an evidentiary hearing before this Court the Respondent's claim that (a) Petitioner's
child support obligation should be established to be not less than $307 per month, and (b)
Respondent be awarded judgment for child support in that amount from August 2006 to the date
of the hearing. Although in her Objection Respondent folly discussed the legal basis for her
claim that Judge Noel's ruling on child support and social security was in error, that argument
was clearly secondary to Respondent's primary objection that the Commissioner had declined to
rule on her claim and to enter the requested judgment without further hearing.
This Court reviewed the parties' respective Objections to the Commissioner's
recommendation and prepared a Minute Entry and Order which was docketed December 22,
2006. In retrospect, it is clear that the Court was distracted by the parties' primary contentions
and failed to focus on the substantive legal argument that is now before the Court. A second
problem was that in its December 22nd Minute Entry, the Court's focus was on clarifying an
earlier ruling which had been a source of contention between the parties (and the basis for the
requested OSC hearing).' Believing it had achieved that goal-and because the Court's prior
ruling had potentially misled Petitioner-the Court concluded that Respondent would not be able
to establish Petitioner's contempt. On that basis the Court reasoned there was no justification for
holding an evidentiary OSC hearing notwithstanding the Commissioner's certification. Because
of its focus when it was considering the Objection, the Court failed to give Respondent's legal
-4-

f7

For his part Petitioner contends that Respondent' s failure tc[) include in her Petition a request

to modify the the child support order precludes her now from raising mat issue as part of the Order
of Modification. Petitioner notes that Respondent failed expressly to allege a substantial change
in circumstances related to child support in her Petition, and also: 'ailed to present any evidence on
this issue at the modification trial. Petitioner also argues that the Provision in the prior Decree that
deems both parents' child support obligations "satisfied" by Hyrum's SSDI payments is "the law
of the case" and, therefore, not subject to re-examination. According to Petitioner, Respondent's
failure to appeal this issue when the Decree entered now forecloses her from raising it anew.
Substantively, Petitioner does not dispute that Respondent should be credited her child support
obligation against Hyrum's SSDI payments. But, he argues, nothing in Utah Code §78B-12-203(8),
precludes him from also receiving a similar credit against his child support obligation, so there is
no error to be remedied.
^8

After considering the parties' arguments and applicable law the Court is persuaded that

Respondent's argument has merit. The Court must revisit this issue to correct legal error.
%9

Addressing first the argument that no request for child support was included in Respondent's

Petition and therefore it should not be addressed as part of an Order of Modification, the Court
disagrees. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(c)(1), provides a mechanism by which the Court can reach the child
support issue. In pertinent part, Rule 54(c)(1) provides that "everv final iudgment shall grant the

argument the attention it deserved.
On these facts the Court concludes that the statutory prohibition on repeated application
for orders, see Utah Code §78A~2-226 (formerly Utah Code §78-7-19), does not bar Responden
from raising the issue anew. Neither does it bar the Court from considering this issue now.
-5-

relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded
such relief in [her] pleadings." The Rule further states that "when the justice of the case requires
it," the Court's judgment may "determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between
. . . themselves."Id. Petitioner is correct that Respondent's Petition did not expressly request the
Court to modify the Decree on these two issues. In an ordinary civil case, a mere recital praying
for such "other relief as the Court may deem appropriate" might well be too thin a reed upon which
to premise a substantive request for relief. The Court concludes, however, that in domestic cases
the issues of custody and support are so intertwined that a request to modify custody also raises, by
implication, the question of child support. That is because, as Respondent correctly notes, "support
follows the child."See Utah Code §§78B-12-108 (2008)) (formerly Utah Code §§ 78-45-4.4). Also,
in adjudicating domestic cases the law grants the Court a greater measure of discretion in exercising
its inherent equitable jurisdiction.
^[10

Petitioner has a stronger argument in his claim that Respondent should have appealed the

error of law she now raises to the Court, and that having failed to do so, she is precluded by "the
law of the case" doctrine from raising that claim. Although it is a stronger argument, ultimately the
Court concludes that it also fails in the unique circumstances of this case. To be sure, had
Respondent been aware at the time the Decree was entered of the legal errors of which she now
complains, she should have sought timely appellate review. But, the Court is not persuaded that
in adjudicating domestic cases the "law of the case" doctrine presents an insurmountable barrier to
review and correction of error. The doctrine provides that "one district court judge cannot overrule
another district court judge of equal authority." Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938,946 (Utah 1987).
-6-

"This doctrine has 'evolved to avoid t h e . . . difficulties that arise v|hen one judge is presented with
an issue identical to one which has already been passed upon by a coordinate judge in the same
case." Id at 947. In this case, however, there is no evidence that [Fudge Noel received the benefit
of any briefing on this issue before he entered the Decree. Therefore, this Court cannot conclude
that the legal issue presented here was ever squarely presented to either Judge Noel or his
immediate successors in a way that allowed the Court to reconsider the ruling. Moreover,
"[notwithstanding the law of the case doctrine, ca trial court is not inexorably bound by its own
precedents."7?em6/y v. Mrs. Field's Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1311 (Utah Ct. App.l994)(citation
omitted). "The law of the case doctrine does not prohibit a judge from catching a mistake and fixing
iirid, quoting Gillmor v. Wright, 859 P.2d 431, 439 (Utah 1993MOrme, J., concurring).
% 11

This Court's review of the applicable statutory and case law persuades it that the provisions

of the Decree dealing with child support and SSDI payments need to be corrected. At this point
the Court has the matter before it in the context of a properly presented Petition to Modify that
Decree. In such a posture the Court can re-examine and, if necessary, completely revise its prior
judgment based on changed circumstances. Because the Court has already determined that there
has been a substantial and material change in circumstances warranting modification, the Court is
free to consider the legal argument raised by Respondent in order |to ensure that, going forward, the
Order of Modification is consistent with law.
^[12

The Court disagrees with Petitioner's argument that it carinot consider these issues because

no financial testimony was presented at trial. These are purely legal issues for the Court to decide,
and the necessary evidence-the parties' financial declarations-were alreadv a matter of record well
-7-

in advance of trial. Therefore, while the parties could have chosen to present financial evidence
at trial, it was not absolutely necessary for them to do so given the record in this case. Moreover,
once the Court's attention was properly focused on these issues the parties were invited to file
supplemental briefs, which they did. Thus, the parties cannot argue that they have been foreclosed
from presenting their legal arguments. In sum, the parties' due process rights were satisfied, and
the Court has adequate information to allow it to reach a decision on these issues,
f 13

Various provisions of the Utah Child Support Act lead the Court to conclude that the

Decree's provisions dealing with child support and with allocation of Hyrum's SSDI payments do
not comport with law in the following respects: First, the Decree did not determine the parties'
"gross incomes" as required by law. Second, it did not establish a child support obligation for each
of the parties in accordance with statutory guidelines. Third, it incorrectly credited Petitioner with
one-half share of Hyrum's SSDI payments. Fourth, it incorrectly "deemed" those benefits to satisfy
fully the parties' respective obligations.
T[ 14

Utah law clearly provides that when minor children are involved in a divorce case, the Court

must establish each parent's child support obligation towards their minor children. Utah Code
§78B-205 (formerly §78-45-7.7) ("Each parent's child support obligation shall be established in
proportion to their adjusted gross incomes, unless the low income table is applicable.")(emphasis
added). Moreover, for any judicial order entered after July 1,1989 that purports to adjudicate child
support matters, "[t]he child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumption in
establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or permanent child support." Utah Code §78B12-210(1) (formerly §78-45-7.2(1 ))(emphasis added).
-8-

f 15

There is no indication in either Judge Noel's Findings of Fabt/Conclusions of Law or Decree

that the Court ever considered the statutory guidelines for child support. There is also no indication
that the Court established a child support obligation for each [parent. To be sure, the Court
referenced generally the parties' monthly incomes, although the Court appears to have incorrectly
included Respondent's SSDI benefits as part of her income. See Utah Code §78B-12-203(3)(b)
(formerly §78-45-7.5(3)(b)) ("specifically excluded from [the statutory definition of] gross income
are .. . benefits received under . . . Social Security Disability Insurance . . . .").
Tfl5

Utah law also states that "Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings

of a parent shall be credited as child support to the parent upon ^hose earning record it is based,
by crediting the amount against the potential obligation of that parent" Utah Code §78B-12203(8)(b) (formerly §78-45-7.5(8)(b))(emphasis added). The Court disagrees with Petitioner's claim
that this provision does not preclude him from being credited with a share of Hyrum's SSDI
payments. As shown by the italicized portions of the statutory language, only the parent on whose
record the child's payments are based-in this case, Robin-is entijled to receive a credit against her
child support obligation. Brooks v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), see also Jensen v.
Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Thus, the Court errid in its Decree when it stated that
"[t]he Social Security payments paid for Hyrum due to Robin's disability are DECREED to satisfy
both parties' child support obligations, with the parties having no further child support claim against
or obligation to each other . . . . " Decree, at ^[6 (emphasis added!
The Court Must Revisit and Calculate the Parties' Respective Obligations Regarding Child Support.
Pursuant to the Commissioner's order, the parties jfiled updated verified financial
-9-

declarations.2 In his declaration Petitioner reported gross income from salary and wages of
$1,889.60 per month. Pursuant to the Court's prior orders and Decree, Petitioner also reported
receiving $317.50 per month as his portion of Hyrum's SSDI payments. For her part, Respondent's
declaration reported gross income from salary and wages at $525.00 per month, $317.50 in SSDI
payments on Hyrum's behalf, and another $1,176.00 in direct SSDI payments to her based on her
disability.
Tfl7

Although no testimony was presented at the modification trial on the parties' income,

neither party has contested the accuracy of the wage and other amounts reflected in their respective
verified declarations. Accordingly, the Court accepts those numbers as correct. Moreover, because
those declarations are part of the official case record, the Court finds that no additional trial
testimony was needed to allow the Court to take cognizance of those figures.
^[18

At ^[25 of her proposed Findings, Respondent attributed Petitioner income of $1,889, and

$1,701 to herself "from employment at Salt Lake Community College and her disability stipend."
Based on those numbers Respondent then proposed to the Court certain Findings regarding each
party's child support obligation. After Petitioner filed his Objections to the proposed Findings,
Respondent re-examined her numbers and now suggests to the Court that she erred in her initial

2

On March 13, 2007 the Commissioner directed the parties to file their updated verified
financial declarations before a pretrial hearing was scheduled. Respondent filed her verified
declaration that same day. On March 30, 2007 the parties' asked the commissioner to schedule
the telephonic pretrial conference; the Commissioner scheduled it for April 24, 2007. Petitioner
did not file his verified declaration until the day of the telephonic pretrial. The Court notes this
because Petitioner has repeatedly accused Respondent of untimely submissions. However, the
record reflects that, more often than not, it is Petitioner's filings that are either untimely or filed
at the last minute.
-10-

calculations by including as part of her monthly "income" her direct SSDI payments. Petitioner
does not challenge this argument.
^[19

The Court agrees with Respondent that pursuant to Utah Ctode §78B-12-203(3) (formerly

§78-45-7.5(3)), SSDI payments are specifically excluded from {gross income for purposes of
determining child support. Thus, in computing Respondent's cqild support obligation, only the
$525 per month she receives as wages should be used in the calculation.
^|20

Although Respondent initially proposed to use the sole custody worksheet in calculating
l

each party's child support obligation-something which Petitioner has challenged-Respondent now
agrees that the appropriate worksheet to be used is the one for joint physical custody worksheet.
The parties disagree, however, on how to compute the "overnights' that Hyrum will have with each
parent for purposes of calculating child support. Petitioner argues that
1 notwithstanding the Court's
§78rulings following the divorce modification trial, under Utah Code §78B-12-102(13)(formerly
<
45-2(13)), the Court actually awarded him "joint physical custody"bf Hyrum. Petitioner "estimates'
that Hyrum will be with him 150 overnights and suggests that is the number to use in computing
child support.3 Respondent answers that the actual number of o\|ernights Hyrum will spend with

Although at f41 of its Findings the Court granted "Robin sole lefgal and physical custody of
Hyrum," the Court acknowledges that the liberal parent-time awarded to Petitioner meets the
definition of "joint physical custody" under Utah Code §786-12-102(13)70/*purposes of
calculating child support. Be that as it may, as explained in thei Court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, these parties have demonstrated they are incapable of cooperating in
Hyrum's best interest. That, of course, is an absolute pre-requisite to a joint custody order.
Therefore, the Court emphasizes that under its Findings and the) Decree of Modification that
Respondent's counsel has been ordered to submit, Respondent jvill be Hyrum'sprimary
physical custodian, her home will be Hyrum's primary physical residence. Not only will
Respondent be Hyrum's designated primary caretaker, she will be the sole decision-maker on all
-11-

Petitioner is 138; Respondent then elaborates on how she arrived at that number based on the
Court's rulings. The calculation provided by Respondent appears to reflect correctly the time
division ordered by the Court, and is much more exact than the unsupported "estimate" offered by
Petitioner. Accordingly, the Court agrees with the parties that the j oint physical custody worksheet
should be employed to calculate the parties' child support obligation, and the Court further finds
that in calculating Petitioner's time with Hyrum, the 138 overnights suggested by Respondent,
rather than the 150 suggested by Petitioner, is the more appropriate number to use.
^[21

The Court adopts Respondent's Exhibit B to her Response to Petitioner's Supplemental

Brief on Child Support as the appropriate basis for calculating the parties' respective obligations.
Using that form the Court finds that Petitioner's base child support obligation is $283.94 per month.
For the reasons given supra at ^15, the $317.50 that Petitioner has been receiving on Hyrum's
behalf should no longer be allocated to him, nor should his child support obligation be credited
against that amount.
Tf22

The Court finds that Respondent's child support obligation is $94.82 per month, and that

amount should be credited against the SSDI amounts received on Hyrum's behalf.
^23

Furthermore, pursuant to Coulon v. Coulon, 915 P.2d 1069 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the Court

finds that the SSDI amounts received for Hyrum in excess of Respondent's child support obligation

issues affecting Hyrum. That said, Respondent should be aware that the Court expects her not
to use this decision-making power to exclude Petitioner from meaningful participation in issues
involving Hyrum's well-being. Based on the testimony received during the trial the Court is
aware that Respondent knows what it felt to be excluded from such opportunities in the past.
With that knowledge and experience, the Court expects that Respondent will act differently in
this regard than Petitioner acted when he was the sole decision-maker.
-12-

are to be used for Hyrum's benefit; Petitioner may not claim crfedit from those "excess" funds.
Rather, they are to be received by Respondent and used by her tor Hvrum's benefit, as she may
determine in her sole discretion.
^[24

The Findings and Conclusions reflected in this Memorandum Decision are to incorporated

by reference into the Court's previously entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The
Court directs Respondent's counsel to prepare the Decree of Modification consistent with these
rulings by the Court.
ORDER
f25

Petitioner's child support obligation is determined to be $283.94 per month. Petitioner is

not entitled to credit his child support obligation against the monthly payments received from SSDI
on Hyrum's behalf. The usual statutory provisions governing how those payments are to be made
(i.e., on the 5th and 20th of each month) apply. Also pursuant to statute, the parties will share equally
the cost of any health insurance premiums for Hyrum, and each shall be responsible for one-half
of any out-of-pocket medical or dental expenses. Reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses shall
be done pursuant to statute. Respondent may avail herself of the services of the Office of Recovery
Services to ensure receipt of these payments in a timely manner
f26

Respondent's child support obligation is determined |to be $94.82 per month. This

obligation shall be credited against Hyrum's SSDI benefits, and \n her sole discretion Respondent
shall use any remaining balance on Hyrum's behalf.
^[27

The parties' respective child support obligations are effective as of the date Respondent

assumed primary physical custody of Hyrum pursuant to the Couift' s Interim Order of Modification.
-13-

^[28

The Court reiterates its prior Order that Respondent is to be the payee for Hyrum's SSDI

benefits.
f29

Respondent's counsel to incorporate the Findings and Conclusions reflected in this

Memorandum Decision into the Decree of Modification.
Tf30

The final matter left for decision-the issue of attorneys fees-will be addressed by the Court

in a separate Minute Entry.
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GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge:
Hi
Douglas Patrick Doyle (Father) appeals itne trial court's
order granting Robin Elaine Doyle's (Mother) motion to modify
custody of their son (Son), arguing that the court made a fatal
procedural error, incorrectly found a substantial and material
change in circumstances had occurred, and erred in determining
that Mother's custody of Son would be in Son's best interest.
See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4 (2007). In addition, Father
argues that even if the trial court correctly modified custody,
it erred in modifying child support because Mother had neither
requested nor was she entitled to such a modification. We affirm
in part and reverse and remand in part for ^ntry of a proper
child support order.
BACKGROUND
12
Father and Mother were divorced by a decree entered in
February 2005. Father, then residing in SatLt Lake City, Utah,

was granted sole legal and physical custody of Son.1 The decree
also afforded Mother, then residing in Denver, Colorado, the
following opportunity: "In the event [Mother] relocates to the
Salt Lake Valley, the parties will have joint legal and physical
custody and shall share time equally in alternating weeks and on
holidays, as per standard schedule" (the joint custody
provision). Less than three months later, in early May 2 005,
Mother moved back to the Salt Lake Valley in order to activate
the automatic joint custody provision. Shortly thereafter,
Father filed a Motion for Relief From Judgment pursuant to rule
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the
joint custody provision impermissibly allowed custody to be
prospectively changed based upon a future triggering event. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) (allowing courts to relieve parties from
orders based on any reason justifying the requested relief, other
than the reasons contained elsewhere in rule 60(b)). The trial
court granted Father's motion, stating that the "change of
custody requires notice and a hearing and cannot occur
automatically upon a specified event." The trial court's order
also maintained Father's custody of Son and amended the original
Divorce Decree, Conclusions of Law[,] and Findings of Fact to
reflect the order.2 Mother did not appeal this order.
1)3
Mother then petitioned to modify the custody award,
asserting that there had been a substantial and material change
in circumstances because (1) she now resided in the Salt Lake
Valley, in the same neighborhood as Father and Son; (2) she had
relocated in reliance on the now-invalidated joint custody
provision, the absence of which makes custody uncertain; and
(3) Son's best interests require stability in his custodial
arrangement, including a stable relationship with Mother. In
response, Father filed a motion to bifurcate the custody
modification hearing into two separate hearings: one to address
whether a substantial and material change in circumstances had
occurred and, if so, a second hearing to determine whether, based
on the changed circumstances, custody modification was in Son's
best interests. The trial court granted Father's unopposed
motion to bifurcate " [t]o the extent that [Father] f s [motion]
merely reaffirms the [statutory] requirement" that the court
first determine whether there has been a substantial and material
x

Son requires special services due to physical and learning
disabilities, some of which stem from a degenerative nerve
disorder.
2

Father's rule 60(b) motion was considered by a different
judge than the judge who entered the divorce decree. A third
judge, Judge Denise P. Lindberg, presided over Mother's petition
to modify.
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change in circumstances before reaching the best interests
determination. The trial court further clarified that it did not
agree with Father "if [his] intent is to have the Court hold
separate trials on the bifurcated issues.
The trial court
accordingly informed the parties that "the material change issue
[will be] presented first, but the parties a hould be prepared to
immediately proceed to presentation of the substantive case if
the court determines the threshold issue has been satisfied."
1[4 At trial on Mother's petition to modify custody, the court
received testimony from several witnesses, ijncluding Dr. Valerie
Hale--the court-appointed custody evaluator- and various
officials from Son's school. At the beginniing of the second
trial day, the court made a "preliminary" finding that
substantial and material changes had occurred since entry of the
Divorce Decree but reserved making a final determination on the
issue until the remainder of the evidence had been presented and
Father had been afforded a full opportunity to rebut Mother's
evidence. The trial court ultimately affirmed this preliminary
finding, stating that the striking of the joint custody
provision, among other factors, constituted a substantial and
material change in circumstances not contemplated in the Divorce
Decree. The trial court then made a best interests
determination, concluding that, consistent with Dr. Hale's
testimony and the recommendations of Dr. Hale and the Guardian Ad
Litem (GAL), Mother's custody of Son was in Son's best interest.
The trial court thus granted Mother's petition to modify custody
and granted Mother sole legal and physical custody of Son.
^5
The trial court also addressed the issue of child support
after requesting and receiving supplemental briefing on that
issue. According to the Divorce Decree, the social security
disability benefits to which Son is entitled (the SSDI benefits)
were credited against the child support obligations of both
parents.3 Otherwise, the Divorce Decree dia not address child
support. Mother argued that the original child support provision
was not legally correct because the SSDI benefits should only
have been credited toward her support obligation, not toward
Father's, because they were based on her disability. In
addition, Mother argued that child support modification was
necessary due to the recent custody modification. Father, on the
other hand, argued that crediting the SSDI benefits to both
parents was not error because it was not specifically prohibited
by either statutory or case law, and that Mother is not entitled
to support modification because she failed to request it in her
petition to modify. The trial court agreed with Mother,
3

The SSDI benefits to which Son is entjLtled stem entirely
from Mother's disability.
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determining that the original decree improperly credited the SSDI
benefits against Father's support obligation, and that, although
Mother did not explicitly request support modification in her
petition, she was entitled to child support because it
necessarily flowed from the custody modification. See id.
R. 54(c) (1) (providing that, with exceptions not applicable to
the present case, "every final judgment shall grant the relief to
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even
if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings").
Child support was modified according to calculations Mother
submitted, based on the table contained in subsection (2) of Utah
Code section 78B-12-301. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-301 (2)
(2008) . Father now appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
H6
Father first argues that the trial court's failure to
"completely" bifurcate the change in circumstances issue from the
best interests issue constitutes reversible error. Whether the
trial court was required to hold separate hearings on these two
issues involves the interpretation of Utah case law. "Pure
questions of law . . . are reviewed for correctness. " Huish v.
Munro, 2008 UT App 283, % 19, 191 P.3d 1242.
i[7
Father next argues that the trial court erred in determining
that there had been a substantial and material change in
circumstances sufficient to justify custody modification. "'The
determination of the trial court that there [has or has not] been
a substantial change of circumstances . . . is presumed valid,
and we review the ruling under an abuse of discretion standard.1"
Young v. Young, 2009 UT App 3, 1 4, 201 P. 3d 301 (quoting
Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, f 10, 997 P.2d 903
(alterations in original)).
^8
Father also argues that the trial court incorrectly
concluded that Son's best interests would be served by modifying
custody to grant Mother sole legal and physical custody, subject
to Father's exercise of liberal parent time. "It is well
established that an appellate court will decline to consider an
argument that a party has failed to adequately brief." Valcarce
v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998).
%9
Finally, Father argues that, in the event the trial court's
custody modification is upheld, the trial court erred in
modifying child support because Mother did not request, nor was
she entitled to, such relief. We review the trial court's legal
determinations regarding Mother's entitlement to child support
modification for correctness. See Wall v. Wall, 2007 UT App 61,
% 7, 157 P.3d 341, cert, denied, 168 P.3d 819 (Utah 2007). As
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for the amount of the modified child support, I " [w] e will not
upset the trial court's apportionment of financial
responsibilities in the absence of manifest injustice or inequity
that indicates a clear abuse of discretion." Maughan v. Maughan,
770 P.2d 156, 161 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
ANALYSIS
I. Custody Modification
1J10 Father's appeal alleges various procedural and legal errors
committed by the trial court during the custody modification
proceedings. In particular, Father challenges the trial court's
decision not to completely bifurcate hearings regarding the
issues of changed circumstances and best interests, arguing that
the trial court improperly allowed best interests evidence to be
presented prior to a determination of changed circumstances.
Father contends that he was prejudiced as a result of this
procedural error. Relatedly, Father argues that the trial court
erred in concluding that a substantial and material change in
circumstances had indeed occurred. Finally, Father claims that
the trial court erred in determining that Son's interests would
best be served with Mother as his primary custodian. We address
each of these issues separately below.
A.

Complete Bifurcation

Ull Father reiterates on appeal an argument ne espoused before
the trial court; namely, that Utah case law requires complete
separation of the changed circumstances and best interests
determinations, effectively preventing a party seeking custody
modification from presenting any evidence relevant to best
interests until it has been judicially determined that a legally
sufficient change in circumstances has taken place. In other
words, Father asks us to presume prejudice where the changed
circumstances and best interests issues arei not decided in
completely separate hearings and evidence on both issues is not
strictly segregated.
fl2 We agree with Father that Utah case lalw requires a
determination that circumstances have materially and
substantially changed before proceeding to la determination of
which parenting arrangement is in the child's best interests.
See Hocrcre v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 53 (Utah 1982) (establishing
two-prong analytical framework for custody modification) ; see
also Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1984) (applying
Hogge and emphasizing that changes must be material, i.e., "the
kind of circumstances on which an earlier custody decision was
based"). However, we, like the trial court, disagree with Father

20080618-CA

5

that evidence or testimony relevant to both a material change in
circumstances and the child's best interests must somehow be
presented separately.
Hl3 Although the analytical framework requiring bifurcation of
these determinations is clear, "[t]his framework says nothing
. . . about how a trial court must receive evidence." Huish v.
Munro, 2008 UT App 283, 1 17, 191 P.3d 1242. Cases decided
subsequent to the establishment of this framework have recognized
that trial courts have discretion to "deci[de] to merge the best
interests of the child into the changed circumstances test
. . . [,] particularly . . . when 'the initial custody award is
premised on a temporary condition, a choice between marginal
custody arrangements, . . . or similar exceptional criteria.1"
Walton v. Walton, 814 P.2d 619, 621 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting
Maucrhan, 770 P.2d at 160). Moreover, in the present case, as is
quite frequently the situation, "the evidence supporting changed
circumstances is . . . the same evidence that is used to
establish the best interests of the child," Moody v. Moody, 715
P.2d 507, 511 (Utah 1985) (Daniels, Dist. J., concurring). And a
trial court is granted "wide discretion in controlling the mode
and order of the presentation of evidence," Huish, 2008 UT App
283, K 18 (citing Utah R. Evid. 611(a) and Paulos v. Covenant
Transp., Inc., 2004 UT App 35, f 20, 86 P.3d 752), "provided it
keteps] its analysis appropriately bifurcated," id. Stated more
succinctly, "it is the bifurcation of the analysis--not the
literal bifurcation of the proceedings--that matters." Id.
^[14 Much of the evidence presented at the modification
proceeding addressed Mother's relocation to the Salt Lake Valley,
Son's decreased sociability and his increasing behavioral and
educational needs, Father's failure to make various parental
adjustments contemplated in the Divorce Decree, and Father's
inability and unwillingness to co-parent with Mother. We do not
agree with Father that this evidence should have been presented
in a separate hearing addressing sequentially the issues of
change in circumstances and Son's best interests. In fact, the
duplicative and overlapping nature of this evidence lends support
to the trial court's decision to hear all the evidence together,
so as to not waste resources of the court, the parties, or the
witnesses. The trial court was also mindful of the unusual
status of this case, resulting from the earlier striking of the
joint custody provision after Mother's relocation in reliance
thereon, Son's rapidly worsening disabilities, and the Divorce
Decree's clear preference that Mother be a part of Son's life to
the extent possible. Furthermore, Father has presented us with
no evidence showing that the trial court conflated its analysis
of the changed circumstances and best interests issues. Because
the trial court bifurcated its analysis of these issues, and
given the unusual circumstances of the case, the overlapping
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nature of the evidence presented, and the trial court's inherent
discretion to control the presentation of evidence, we see no
error in the trial court's failure to completely bifurcate the
hearings. See id. f 19.

B.

Substantial and Material Change in Circumstances

1115 Father also argues that the trial court erred in determining
that a substantial and material change in circumstances had
occurred. Mother categorizes this determination as factual in
nature and argues that Father has failed to marshal the evidence
required to properly challenge this factual rinding. Father
responds, clarifying that his challenge is not directed toward
the trial court's factual findings but instead is aimed at
whether the trial court's "findings of fact themselves are
insufficient as a matter of law to support the legal conclusion
that there has been a material and substantiail change of
circumstances." Because Father characterizes this determination
as a legal one, he urges us to apply a correfc:tness standard of
determination of
review. However, Utah law makes clear that
whether substantial and material changes hav^ occurred is a f actintensive legal determination that is presumed valid and is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Young v. Young, 2009 UT
App 3, f 4, 201 P. 3d 301. Also, in making sluch a determination,
trial courts must be mindful of two guiding principles:
(1) the
inquiry must "ordinarily . . . focus exclusively on the parenting
ability of the custodial parent and the functioning of the
established custodial relationship,
relationship," Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d
624, 626 (Utah 1987) and (2) the changed circumstances allegedly
justifying the modification must be material! that is, they must
"be the kind of circumstances on which [the] earlier custody
decision was based," Becker, 694 P.2d at 610
Ultimately, the
party seeking modification bears the burden of demonstrating a
substantial change in circumstances. See Walton, 814 P.2d at
621
^|16 In determining that a qualifying changi in circumstances had
occurred, the trial court made the following findings:
[T]he [original custody] decision was
based on the fact that, at the time, [Mother]
was residing and working in Colorado and
[Son] was doing well in a stable and
supportive environment under [Father's] care.
Relying on the [joint custody provision]
of the Divorce Decree, . . . [Mother]
informed her employer she would not be
renewing her teaching contract, and completed
her relocation to Salt Lake (and Ito rson'sl
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neighborhood) within six to eight weeks
following entry of the Decree.
The parties demonstrated their
understanding of [the] Decree by the fact
that they began implementing the [joint]
custody provision [] of the Divorce Decree
even as they sought to change it.
When [it was] determined that the
automatic change [detailed in the joint]
custody provision [] of the Divorce Decree
violated Utah law, the parties were faced
with a new legal interpretation of the Decree
that neither side could have foreseen at the
time it was entered.
Additionally, [the original judge]
clearly anticipated that [Father]?s parenting
skills would continue to develop, and that he
would adopt less harsh discipline methods
toward[] [Son]. In fact, however, [Father]
has continued to rely excessively on corporal
punishment . . . .

At the time the Divorce Decree was entered,
[the original judge] also expected that [Son]
would continue to enjoy stability and success
in [Father] fs care. Contrary to [the
original judge]'s expectations, the evidence
presented at trial leads the Court to find
that [Son] has not been thriving in
[Father]'s care. . . . [C]redible testimony
from Dr. Valerie Hale, the Court-appointed
evaluator, leads the Court to find that since
[the original judge] entered his findings,
[Son]' s level of social, educational, and
psychological functioning has deteriorated.
Indeed, at various times since the Decree
[was] entered, [Son] has displayed increased
anxiety levels and seriously dysfunctional
ideation and behaviors.[]
[The original judge found] "that if
either [Father] or [Mother] do not foster a
loving relationship for [Son] by both parents
for the benefit of [Son], by . . . limiting
access to the child unreasonably . . . then
. . . th[at] parent does not have the best
interest of [Son] at heart and the Court
would take that into account in the future,
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if any petition to modify the Decrele of
Divorce comes before the Court."
Testimony from Dr. Valerie Hale . . .
indicates that [Father] has attempted to
marginalize [Mother]'s relationship with
[Son] by taking actions such as unplugging
the phone, . . . restricting other contacts
between [Son] and [Mother] . . . [and]
objecti[ng] to having [Mother] participate in
[Son's mandatory special needs m^tnnas at
school].
The trial court also took note of the fact that the judge who
entered the Divorce Decree took steps to ensure that both parents
could be a part of Son's life to the fullest extent possible;
most notable among these steps was the inclusion of the nowinvalidated joint custody provision.
fl7 In sum, the trial court found that sincffe entry of the
Divorce Decree, Mother had relocated to Son' js neighborhood, the
joint custody provision had been invalidated), Fatherfs parenting
skills had not improved, Son's educational and social performance
had deteriorated, and Father had actively attempted to exclude
Mother from Son's life. Implicit in the trial court's findings
is the fact that the current custody arrangement had proven
unworkable, and this by itself is sufficient to meet the changed
circumstances threshold. See Huish, 2008 UT App 283, f 13.
Moreover, none of these facts was anticipated in the Divorce
Decree, they "focus [almost] exclusively on the parenting ability
of the custodial parent and the functioning of the established
custodial relationship," see Kramer, 738 P.2d at 626, and they
address "the kind of circumstances on which [the] earlier custody
decision was based," see Becker, 694 P.2d at 610. Thus, in light
of the trial court's detailed factual findings and the unusual
legal and factual changes in this case, we see no abuse of
discretion in the trial court's determination that there had been
a substantial and material change in circumstances since entry of
the Divorce Decree.
C.

Son's Best Interests

1|l8 Father also cursorily argues that the [trial court erred in
determining that custody modification was in Son's best
interests. However, "[i] t is well established that an appellate
court will decline to consider an argument that a party has
failed to adequately brief." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d
305, 313 (Utah 1998). An argument is inadequately briefed if it
"wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to support [it] ."
State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). The entirety of
Father's argument regarding Son's best interests is one paragraph
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long, provides no citation to legal authority or the record, and
contains only conclusory statements such as "[Father] cared for
[Son] with utmost care." Because Father's best interests
argument is inadequately briefed, we decline to address it
further.4
II. Child Support Modification
fl9 Father contends that the trial court's modification of child
support following the order of custody modification was legally
inappropriate because Mother neither asked for, nor was she
entitled to, such relief. Father further alleges that the trial
court applied the wrong child support guidelines in determining
the amount of child support. We address each of these arguments
in turn.
A.

Modification of Child Support Is Legally Appropriate

f20 Father argues first that Mother's failure to request support
modification in her petition to modify custody is fatal to the
trial court's award. The trial court recognized Mother's failure
to request support modification in her petition but nevertheless
determined that rule 54(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, combined with a trial court's inherent discretion in
domestic cases, allows the modification in this case. We agree.
U21 Rule 54(c)(1) states, in pertinent part, that "every final
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor
it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded
such relief in his pleadings." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(c)(1). This
rule also allows trial courts discretion, in the interest of
justice, to "determine the ultimate rights of the parties . . .
as between . . . themselves." Id. The Utah Code further
buttresses the trial court's child support decision, stating that
" [o]bligations ordered for child support . . . are for the use
and benefit of the child and shall follow the child." Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-12-108(1) (2008) (emphasis added). Rule 54(c)(1) and
the Utah Code, when considered together, allow the trial court
discretion to modify the parties' child support obligations
despite Mother's failure to request such relief in her petition.
f22 Father also contends that even if the trial court had the
discretion to modify child support, it was not appropriate
because the original order in the Divorce Decree was adequate.
We disagree. Utah Code section 78B-12-203(8)(b) provides that
4

We nevertheless observe that there was sufficient evidence
that Son's best interests would be served by the custody
modification.
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"Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings
of a parent shall be credited as child support to the parent upon
whose earning record it is based, by crediting the amount against
the potential obligation of that parent." Id. § 78B-12-203(8)(b)
(emphasis added). When entering the Divorce Decree, the trial
court credited the SSDI benefits against both parents' support
obligations, despite the fact that the benefits stem entirely
from Mother's disability.
f23 Although Father acknowledges that the SSDI benefits should
be credited toward Mother's support obligaticpn, he argues that
nothing in the language of section 78B-12-20L 8) precludes the
trial court from crediting the SSDI benefits toward his support
obligation as well. Again, we disagree. The plain language of
section 78B-12-203 (8) clearly states that such benefits are to be
credited against the support obligation of "the parent upon whose
earning record it is based." Id. This language does not give
trial courts discretion to alter this credit
See id. cf.
Meenderink v. Meenderink, 2006 UT App 348, J 8, 144 P.3d 219
(determining that the trial court had no di ^cretion to decide
whether or how to apply the credit for social security disability
benefits, stating simply that the predecessor to section 78B-12203(8) "mandates full crediting of the SSDI payments toward [the
earning parent's] child support obligation"). Accordingly, we
conclude that the trial court did not err in modifying child
support to provide Mother and Son the relief to which they are
entitled and to correct the error in the original child support
award.5
B.

The Amount of Modified Child Support ii Incorrect

f24 Father asserts that even if support modification is
appropriate, the amount of the support awarded is incorrect
because the trial court applied the wrong statutory child support
guidelines. Section 78B-12-301 of the Utah Code contains two
tables to be used for establishing or modifying child support
orders. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-3 01. Which table to be used
is determined by the date of the establishment or modification of
the support order. The table contained in subsection (1) applies
established or modified on or
to any "child support order
before December 31, 2007," while the table in subsection (2) is
5

Relatedly, Father briefly argues that the law of the case
doctrine prevents the trial court from modifying the original
support order even if it was entered in error. We disagree,
because the law of the case doctrine does not go so far as to
"prohibit a judge from catching a mistake and fixing it."
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1311 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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to be used--with several exceptions not relevant to our analysis-to modify all "support order[s] entered for the first time on or
after January 1, 2008." Id. § 78B-12-301(1)-(2).
^25 Although Father contends that the Divorce Decree contained
an order relating to child support, Mother argues that the decree
"did not include a child support order, as contemplated by the
[Utah Code.]" Mother further asserts that the Divorce Decree
failed to include required findings for a child support order and
determined that the SSDI benefits were awarded in lieu of a child
support order. Mother therefore urged the trial court to modify
support based upon the table in subsection (2) . The trial court
agreed with Mother and applied the table in subsection (2)
because it concluded that the Divorce Decree did not contain a
child support order. To determine the correctness of this
conclusion, we must decide whether the 2005 Divorce Decree
includes a child support order: If it does, then the table in
subsection (1) should have been applied; if it does not, then the
trial court correctly applied the table in subsection (2) . See
id.
^2 6 In connection with granting custody of Son to Father, the
Divorce Decree stated that "it is reasonable to allow [the SSDI]
benefits to serve as child support and it is reasonable to not
require child support to be paid by [Mother] . " The Divorce
Decree thus concluded that the SSDI benefits "should be used to
satisfy both parties' child support obligations, with the parties
having no further child support claim against or obligation to
each other." Despite Mother's arguments to the contrary, this
order clearly addressed child support and is therefore properly
considered a child support order. Because the Divorce Decree
contained a child support order and was entered "before December
31, 2007," the trial court erred in applying the table in
subsection (2) to determine the modified child support amount.
See id. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a determination
of the amount Father must pay under the table contained in
subsection (1).
CONCLUSION
f27 We conclude that the trial court did not err in failing to
hold separate hearings on the issues of changed circumstances and
best interests. We also see no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's determination that substantial and material changes had
occurred since entry of the Divorce Decree. And because Father
has inadequately briefed his challenge to the trial court's best
interests determination, we affirm that determination as well.
Thus, there was no error in the trial court's decision to modify
custody. Finally, we conclude that although it was proper for
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the trial court to modify child support, the trial court applied
the wrong guidelines in determining the amount: thereof. We
therefore affirm the trial court's decision in all respects
except for its determination of the amount of modified child
support, which determination we reverse and remand so that the
court may recalculate child support according) to the correct
child support guidelines.

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

1(28 WE CONCUR:

William A. T h o r n e J r . ,

Carolyn B. McHugh,
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